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Foreword
One of the important areas of ICRIER’s research is that of Macroeconomics and
growth.  We intend to systemise and deepen this policy research and expand it to include
issues of employment and poverty.
The current working paper is the first in a series of papers on Indian Economic
growth  performance.    There  is  much  mis-perception  about  Indian  economic  growth
history, not only among foreigners, but even among Indians.  It is therefore necessary to
start with a simple paper that sets forth the basic unvarnished facts and sets the record
straight.  The paper also explores some of the causes of changes in growth trends and
variations in performance.  A deeper analysis will however be carried out in subsequent
papers.  The next paper will explore the productivity performance that underlines the
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Abstract
This paper reviews India’s growth performance since independence.  Phrases such
as “Hindu Rate of  Growth,” sometimes make a telling  comment  and  expose  obscure
economic  data  to  a  wider  audience,  but  they  can  just  as  readily  obscure  reality  by
focussing attention on the wrong issue.  There is nothing in the literature that suggests
that this period of the “Hindu Rate of Growth” had anything to do with Hinduism per se.
This paper shows that had a lot to do with the Indian version of Socialism.  The 30-year
period from 1950-51 to 1979-80 is therefore better described as the “Indian-socialist” or
perhaps “Hindu-socialist” period.  The paper also identifies a truly disastrous 15-year
sub-period within this Indian-socialist period, the negative lessons of which have still not
been fully understood or absorbed by academics, policy makers and political parties.
One  of  the  innovations  in  this  paper  is  to  take  explicit  account  of  rainfall
variations that play a very important role in the  Indian  economy.    This  allows us  to
determine  whether  the  Indian  economy  has  become  less  dependent  on  the  monsoons
(‘drought  proof’).    It  also  allows  a  statistically  more  accurate  determination  of  the
different phases of Indian economic growth.  The paper confirms that, what the author
has earlier dubbed, the “Bharatiya Rate of Growth” phase began around 1980-81.  The
paper fills out the sector details of the various phases of development and the role that
government and government monopoly has played in different sectors.  The paper also
explores some of the growth puzzles in our economic history.
Key Words: Indian Economy, Economic Growth, Development, Phases of Growth,
Socialism, Government Monopoly, Bharatiya Rate of Growth.
JEL Number: N1, O1, O4, O5, P0
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Ahluwalia and Wilima Wadhwa for comments on earlier versions (starting with June 2003 version) of the
paper.  My thanks to Jayant V. Ganguli for excellent research assistance.1
I.  Introduction
How has the Indian economy performed since independence?  Prof. Raj Krishna
popularised  the  phrase  ‘Hindu  rate  of  growth’  in  the  seventies,  during  the  period  of
increasing controls and slowing growth rate.
1  K N Raj (1984) however questioned this
“so-called ‘Hindu’ rate of growth,” hypothesis. Patnaik (1987) and Dhar (1988) discerned
some acceleration of growth in the eighties, while Virmani (1989) asserted a break in the
growth rate from 1980–81. Nagaraj (1990) and Bhargava and Joshi (1990) did not find
the break statistically significant.
2 Dandekar (1992) and Ahluwalia (1995) also noted the
increase in growth rate during the eighties. Nevertheless there was a widespread belief in
the general public that the Indian economy was stuck since independence in the ‘Hindu
rate  of  growth,’  of  about  3.5%  per  annum.  This  conventional  wisdom  prevailed
throughout the eighties and perhaps into the nineties.
3
The  conventional  wisdom  changed  again  around  the  mid-nineties.  The
new conventional wisdom was that the ‘new economic policy’ introduced in 1991–92 had
transformed the Indian economy and pushed it from the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ of 3.5%
to a new higher rate that was variously estimated to lie between 5% and 6%. The latter
has sometimes been referred to as the ‘new Hindu rate of growth.’ This new conventional
wisdom  was  also  immune  to  papers  such  as  Virmani  (1997a  and  1997b)  that
demonstrated that the growth acceleration preceded the new economic policy.
4  Only
recently has this been explicitly  recognised [De  Long  (2001),  Williamson  and  Zagha
(2002), Acharya (2002)].
A  new  series  of  national  accounts  statistics  was  introduced  by  the  Central
Statistical  Organisation  (CSO)  based  on  1993–94  prices.  Over  the  last  few  years  the
series has been extended backwards and is now available from 1950 onwards. We use
this data to revisit the issue of growth phases in Indian economic development.
                                                          
1B P R Vithal was perhaps the first to refer to Hindu culture as in some way affecting economic
development. My thanks to Y. V Reddy and Sanjaya Baru for this information.
2 The former says that the evidence of a break cannot be rejected though.
3 This was reflected in domestic and foreign newspapers & magazine articles.2
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  II  analyses  the  historical  growth
experience of the Indian economy in terms of phases. The paper finds a sub-phase of
economic growth, dubbed the “Socialist Rate of Growth (SRG)” in which the  Indian
economy had the worst performance in its post-independence history.  The paper also
confirms that there was a new phase of growth, measured by the rate of growth of the
GDP (gross domestic product) at factor cost (GDPfc), starting in 1980–81 that we call the
‘Bharatiya  rate  of  growth  (BRG).’  We  also  find  that  each  phase  can  be  further  sub-
divided into two sub-phases characterised by differences in policy approach and growth
performance.  The  two  sub-phases  of  BRG  throw  up  important  puzzles  regarding  the
impact  of  policy  changes  and  economic  reforms  on  growth  performance.    Section  II
attempts also to unravel these puzzles, as they need to be resolved for informing the
debate on future Indian growth.
Section III puts the Indian growth performance in an international perspective, to
assess how India’s growth rate during the different sub-phases compared with that of
other countries. Section IV concludes the paper.
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 While Bhagwati (1998) acknowledges the higher growth rate of the eighties, he does not consider the
1980 as a new phase in Indian development because he believes that the unsustainable policies of the
eighties led to the 1990-91 BOP crisis.3
II. Phases of Independent Development
The  focus  of  our  analysis  is  on  the  post-colonial  period  after  India  attained
independence in 1947.  The term “Independent development” is therefore merely a short
form for ‘development of Independent India.’ This paper covers the period from 1950-51
onwards for which consistent data series are available.  This means that growth rates are
available from 1951-2 onwards.   Though we use a fairly simple methodology, a brief
overview of this methodolgy is given in the appendix for non-technical readers as well as
for those interested in the logic behind the statistical exercises that follow.
A.  GDP Growth Trends
The section starts with an examination of growth trends in the Indian economy
since  independence  to  determine  what  if  any  breaks  there  have  been  in  growth
performance.  It then goes on to statistically determine the break points, which form the
dividing line between different phases of economic growth.  Subsequent sub-sections
investigate to what extent the break in overall growth trends was due to a break in the
trend growth of agriculture, manufacturing and services.
 Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the annual growth rate of the economy, the growth
trend in the HP (Hodrick-Prescott) filtered GDP series and the moving average of the
growth rates over the half century.  Two phases are clearly discernible, with the second
phase having a significantly higher rate of economic growth than the first.  This can be
seen from either the growth rate trend of the HP-filtered series or the ten-year moving
average.
5  Figure 1 also shows that in the first 30 years there were four years in which the
annual rate of growth was negative, and another four in which it was between 0% and
2%. In the subsequent 22 years there was no year of negative growth and only one year in
which economic growth was between 0% and 2%. The average growth rate was therefore
higher during this second phase. The growth trend as measured by the HP-filtered series
reached a low point of 3.3% per annum during the first phase (1971–72 to 1973–74) and
a  highpoint  of  6.1%  per  annum  during  the  second  phase  (1994–95  to  1995–96).
                                                          
5 The five-year moving average is centred on the given year, while the 10-year moving average has five
earlier and four later years.4
Thereafter, the trend growth rate has declined continuously (see HP filtered series). The
10-year moving average fluctuated between 3% and 4% during the first 30 years with
occasional  forays  below  (twice)  and  above  (thrice)  this  band.  Starting  from  1978–79
there was a clear and unambiguous up trend in the 10-year moving average and it never
fell below 4%. On the contrary it exceeded 5% from 1985–86 onwards (figure 2).
To find the precise dividing line between these two phases (the year T in which
the first phase ended) one can look at the nature of the prevailing development regime or
the  nature  of  the  growth  experience  or  a  combination  of  both.  First,  consider  what
happens to the average growth rate and the co-efficient of variation (CV) of the growth
rates of phase I (1950–01 to T) relative to phase II (T to 2002–03) as we change the year
T (Figure 3).
6  There is a clear break in both the mean and CV if phase I ends in 1978–79.
The relative CV falls sharply from 0.7 if T = 1978–79 to 0.3 if T = 1979–80. The relative
mean correspondingly  rises from 1.4 to 1.65. This is the  lowest  relative  CV  and  the
highest relative mean seen in Figure 3 , suggesting that phase I ends in 1978–79.
                                                          


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.  Break points in GDP growth
We can also run growth regressions to test for changes in growth rate. Equation
(1)  presents  the  results  for  a  standard  regression  for  the  period  1950–2002,  with  the
growth  rate  of  the  GDP  at  factor  cost  (GrGDPfc)  on  the  left-hand  side.  The  severe
droughts of 1965-66 and 1966-67 and 1979-80 can lead to misleading results if rainfall is
not accounted for.  We therefore introduce the deviation of current rainfall from the mean
for the entire period (DRainMean) as an exogenous variable on the right hand side of the
growth regression.  Separating the effect of trends in rainfall allows  a more accurate
determination of underlying growth trends, particularly if the end point is a drought year.
(1)  GrGDPfc = 0.045 + 0.161*DrainMean – 0.117*DrainMean(-1)
(13.8) (5.0)  (-3.5)
      R
2  =  0.447,  R
2  (adjusted)  =  0.425,  DW  =  2.029  and  the  numbers  in
parentheses are t-statistics.  The Chow test clearly reveals a break in the growth rate in
1980-81 with the null hypothesis rejected at an F value of 5.562 (probability 0.0024).
1981-82 is however a close second with an F of 5.347 (Pr=0.003).
7
We now add a dummy for 1980-81 onwards (D80+) on the right-hand side to get
(2) GrGDPfc = 0.0345+0.023*(D80+) +0.190*DrainMean –0.104*DrainMean(-1) – 0.303*AR(1)
(12.0) (5.2) (6.7) (-3.6) (2.1)
 R
2 = 0.623, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.590, DW =2.054.
Regression (2) confirms that the growth rate increased from 1980–81.  We also
define Drainmean80 = Drainmean*D80+ and estimate the following equation to test for
changes in the coefficients from 1980-81 onwards.
(2’) GrGDPfc = 0.0349+0.023*(D80+) +0.218*DrainMean –0.124*DrainMean(-1) – 0.339*AR(1)
  (12.2)    (5.2)    (5.9)  (-3.5)    (-2.3)
- 0.072*Drainmean80 + 0.060*Drainmean80(-1)
                                                          
7 The log likelihood ratio is 16.1(‘80) & 15.6(’81). The F value is much lower at 2.884 (Pr 0.0450) for
1979.9
  (-1.23)    (+0.98)
 R
2 = 0.638, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.589, DW =2.044.  The two new variables are found
to be insignificant, while all variables present in equation (2) remain significant with their
coefficients virtually unchanged. Thus we conclude that there is no change in the effect
of rainfall on the growth rate from 1980-81 onwards and we can use equation (2) for
further analysis.
A significant experiment with coalition government ended in 1979–80 and the
Congress(I) party returned to power in 1980–81. The recognition that the controls and
subsidies  introduced  by  the  Congress  governments  during  the  earlier  phase  were  not
serving their intended purpose, had gradually dawned on the establishment during the late
seventies.
8  The  new  government  gradually  initiated  a  new  approach  to  economic
management.  We, therefore, take 1979-80 as the end of the first development phase and
1980-81 as the start of the next.
The issue of stagnation or deceleration in Indian growth after 1965–66 has been
the subject of much debate and analysis [Narayana and Srinivasan (1977)
9, Bhagwati and
Srinivasan  (1984),  Chakravarty  (1984),  Raj  (1984),  Dhar  (1988),  Nagaraj  (1990),
Bhargava and Joshi (1990)]. Chow stability tests on equation (1) show a possible break
point around 1963-4 with an F value of 2.09 (prob=0.11) and a log likelihood ratio of
6.64 (probability 0.084) with marginally lower values of F and log likely hood in 1962-3
and  1964-5.  These  values  are  however  much  lower  than  for  the  breakpoint  at  1980-
1(above).  A joint Chow test for 1980-1 and 1963-4 (etc.) yields a singular matrix. We
therefore use growth regression analyses equation (2) and introduce another dummy for
1965-6  to  1979-80  (and  similar  periods).  All  these  dummies  turn  out  to  be  non-
significant, confirming that there are no other statistically significant breaks in growth
once the 1980-81 break is accounted for.
10
                                                          
8 The Dagli committee on Controls and Subsidies, set up by the coalition government which was aware of
the problem, submitted its report in 1979-80
9 According to Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1984), this is the first paper “to analyse the growth stagnation of
the Indian economy since the mid-sixties.”
10 Dummy variables for potential breaks in 1971–72 and 1975–76 are even less significant.10
 Figure 4 indicates why this may be so. If we divide the entire period of phase I
into two sub-phases ending in different years, and measure the relative CV of the two
sub-phases we find a sharp change in 1965–66. The CV of sub-phase IB relative to that
of sub-phase IA falls from 2.3 if the end-year for sub-phase IA is 1964–65 to 1.3 if the
end-year is 1965–66. The relative mean, however, changes by a very small amount. Thus,
the break is more in terms of the degree of variability of growth rather than in terms of
the mean growth rate (Figure 4).
Similar  results  are  obtained  for  a  possible  break  at  the  end  of  the
eighties/beginning of the nineties using equation (1).  The chow test shows a significant
value for F and Log likelihood ratio in 1989-90 and 1992-3 but these values are lower
than for the 1980-81 break. Thus for the potential 1989-90 breakpoint the F value is 3.22
(probability 0.031) and likelihood 9.934 (probability 0.019). Both these fall sharply in
1990-91  and  1991-2  and  then  rise  in  1992-93  to  3.37  (prob  =0.026)  and  10.3
(prob=0.015).    When  however  the  latter  is  used  along  with  the  1980-81  it  yields  a
singularity.  We therefore have to use equation (2) with an additional dummy for 1992-3
onwards.  This dummy is found to be non-significant while D80  (1980-1 to 2002-3)
remains strongly significant (as are others starting in 1990-1 & 1991-92).  An alternative
formulation with D80 replaced by two dummies for 1980-1 to 1991-2 and 1992-93 to
2002-3 shows that the coefficients on these are virtually identical. Therefore we find no
additional breakpoint in the nineties, once the breakpoint in 1980-81 is accounted for.
2.  Agricultural Slow down or Green Revolution?
          There has been a suspicion that the drop in GDP growth from 1965-66 is due to the
fall in agricultural growth from the mid-sixties.  Further it was felt that the introduction of
the Green revolution thereafter (around the early seventies) led to a fundamental change
in the growth potential of agriculture.  We therefore test statistically for break points
using the following equation for the growth rate of GDP from agriculture (GrGDPag):
(3a)  GrGDPag = 0.030 + 0.358*DrainMean – 0.337*DrainMean(-1)
(4.83)  (5.86)  (-5.32)
      R
2 = 0.577, R






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The chow test using this equation reveals a potential breakpoint at 1964-65, with an F =
3.583 (probability 0.0207) and Log likelihood ratio = 10.921 (probability (0.031). The F
is also above 3 for 1963-4 and 1962-3, while the Log likelihood ratio is above 10 for
1963-4.  These values are much higher than found for a breakpoint for GDP around these
years. However, when we introduce  a dummy  for  1964-5  onwards  (or  for  1950-1  to
1963-4) we find that it is insignificant.  Because of the significant auto-correlation in
equation (3a), we also estimate an alternative specification as follows:
 (3b)  GrGDPag = 0.029 + 0.3885*DrainMean – 0.372*DrainMean(-1)-0.492 AR(1)
(8.0)     (7.26)  (-6.67)                              (-3.93)
      R
2 = 0.686, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.666, DW = 2.27
The chow test using this equation reveals a potential breakpoint at 1962-63, with an F =
3.31 (probability 0.0189) and Log likelihood ratio = 11.59 (probability (0.021). The F is
1.47 for 1961-2 while the Log likelihood ratio is above 6.55.  The value for 1962-63 is
much higher than found for a break point for GDP in the mid-sixties. However, when we
introduce a dummy for 1962-63 onwards (or for 1950-1 to 1961-2) we find that it is
insignificant.
11 If we apply the Chow test for subsequent years, we find that the F value
falls to about 1 for 1967-8 to 1980-81 and is lower than one for any potential break points
thereafter (up to the 1990s).
12  Thus we do not find any statistical break in the growth of
GDP from agriculture during the 53-year period, once the variations in rainfall are
accounted for.
When Drainmean80 and its lagged value are introduced into the right hand side of
equation (3b) their coefficients are found to be insignificant.  This confirms that there is
no  change  in  the  effect  of  rainfall  variations  on  GDP  from  agriculture  even  after
1980-81.
Conventional wisdom has been that Indian agriculture and the economy has
become less dependent on the weather since the eighties. This has been based on the fact
that share of GDP from agriculture has declined and that of services has increased.  The
                                                          
11 Alternative dummys for 1963-4, 1964-5 etc. are also insignificant.
12 A similar equation is also estimated for manufacturing growth: Using this equation Chow tests for
growth break for 1980-81 shows an F = 1.653 (0191) and LLR = 5.33 (0.149). The values become even
less significant for 1979-80 and 1981-2.13
above results along with those in equation (2’) contradict this conclusion and imply that
there is no change in the impact of rainfall fluctuations on the Indian economy.
3.  Manufacturing
The same exercise was repeated for the manufacturing sector with similar results.
The basic equation with GrGman as the rate of growth of GDP from manufacturing, is as
follows:
(4a) GrGman = 0.059 + 0.127*DrainMean
(12.2)  (2.68)
      R
2 = 0.126, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.108, DW = 1.63.
This is tested using the chow test for the years from 1979 to 1987 to find a potential
break point at 1981 [F=2.02 (Pr=0.14)].  To confirm this we introduce D81 the dummy
for 1981-2 to 2002-3 into this equation:
(4b) GrGman = 0.051 + 0.019*D81 + 0.14*DrainMean
(8.3)  (2.03)            (3.03)
      R
2 = 0.194, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.181, DW = 1.75.
This  shows  that  the  growth  rate  of  manufacturing  accelerated  after  1980-81.  This
contributed to the acceleration of the rate of growth of GDP from 1981-2.
13
4.  Non-tradable Services
Virmani (2002c) showed that non-tradable services have played an important role
in the growth of the Indian economy since 1950. It is useful to investigate a potential
break out in the growth of non-tradable services (GrGntrdbl). To ensure that the changes
are not due to government administration or the way these are measured we also use non-
tradable services excluding GDP from government administration (GrGserv). The basic
equation is
(5a)  GrGntrdbl = 0.058 + 0.039*DrainMean + 0.501 AR(1)
(11.8)     (1.82)  (4.00)
      R
2 = 0.287, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.257, DW = 2.10.14
The Chow test using equation (5a) reveals potential breakpoints in every  year
from 1980-1 to 1985-6.  The highest probability of a break is however found for 1985-86
with  an  F  =  5.28  (probability  0.003)  and  Log  likelihood  ratio  =  15.37  (probability
0.0015).  These values and probabilities are similar to those found for the GDP growth
break point in 1980-81.   In this case, however  the  F  value  is  higher  than  4  and  log
likelihood ratio higher than 12 for all years from 1980-81 to 1985-6.  To confirm the
break point for non-tradable services in 1985-86 we add a dummy for 1985-86 onwards
into (5a);
(5b)  GrGntrdbl = 0.0475 + 0.027*D85 + 0.068*DrainMean
   (18.3)      (6.1)               (3.26)
      R
2 = 0.465, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.443, DW = 1.67.
This  confirms  that  there  is  a  breakout  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  non-tradable
services in 1985-86. Alternative equations with D80, D81 etc still show high (but lower)
statistical significance but have lower explanatory power (R
2 ).
The equation for GrGerv is very similar but has even higher explanatory power
because of stronger effect of variations in rainfall.  The chow tests on this equation also
show the same pattern with 1985-6 as the post probable breakpoint [F=5.15(Pr=0.003),
LLR=15.06  (Pr  0.0018)]  and  1984-5  a  very  close  second  [F=5.14  (Pr=0.003),
LLR=15.06(Pr=0.002)].  The final equation corresponding to (5b) is,
  (5c)  GrGserv = 0.0463 + 0.028*D85 + 0.083*DrainMean
   (17.5)      (6.16)              (3.78)
      R
2 = 0.498, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.477, DW = 1.82.
This suggests that the acceleration in the growth of GDP from services was a
gradual process from 1980-81 to 1985-86, and it became firmly established in 1985-86.
To summarise the results of this section, the rate of growth of agriculture as well
as the effect of rainfall on it remained unchanged during the entire period of over 50
years. Thus there was no change in the marginal impact of rainfall variation on economic
                                                                                                                                                                            
13 The contribution of manufacturing growth to overall growth is quantified below.15
growth.  Manufacturing growth, however, started reviving in 1980-1 and was soon joined
by services.  This led to  a  significant  acceleration  in  overall  growth  starting  1980-1.
Subsequently  around  1984-85  or  1985-86  there  was  an  additional  (sustained)  growth
impulse arising from the service sector.
B.  Phase I: Indian Version of Socialism
The  period  of  30  years  from  1950–51  to  1979–80  was  the  phase  of  socialist
experimentation, in which the Indian version of socialism was developed. Chakravarty
(1987)  presents  a  detailed  exposition  of  the  underlying  economic  rationale  and
documents  some  of  the  ideological  and  political  factors.  In  this  phase  the  economy
averaged a rate of growth of 3.5% per annum (Table 1) and average income, measured by
per capita GDP, grew at 1.3% per annum. Growth during this period was fairly volatile,
with a co-efficient of variation of 1.
Table 1: Macro-Economic Growth Parameters during Different Phases
Phase I (1951-52 to 1979-80) Phase II (1980-81 to 2001-02)
Sub-phase Sub-phase
I A  I B  II A  II B
Phase I (1951-64) (1965-79) Phase II (1980-91) (1992-2001)
Growth rate (%)
GDP (market prices) 3.6% 4.4% 2.9% 5.7% 5.5% 6.0%
   GDP (factor cost) 3.5% 4.1% 2.9% 5.2% 5.5% 6.1%
   GDP at factor cost (HP filtered) 3.7% 3.9% 3.5% 5.5% 5.2% 5.8%
   Per capita GDP at market prices 1.4% 2.3% 0.6% 3.6% 3.3% 3.9%
   Per capita GDP at factor cost 1.3% 2.0% 0.6% 3.6% 3.2% 4.1%
Private consumption (PFCE) 3.2% 3.7% 2.8% 4.7% 4.5% 4.9%
Government consumption (GFCE) 5.8% 6.6% 5.1% 6.3% 6.0% 6.6%
Investment (GDCF) 6.1% 7.9% 4.5% 6.3% 5.0% 7.8%
  Machinery & equipment 6.6% 9.7% 3.7% 8.9% 9.9% 7.9%
 Private GFCF 3.6% 3.5% 3.8% 8.5% 8.4% 8.6%
Goods and Services Export 3.8% 0% 10.2% 9.5% 8.4% 10.8%
Oil Import 37.1% 9.8% 6.9% 13.2%
Coefficient of Variation (Std/mean)
GDP at Market prices 0.9 0.5 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.2
GDP at Factor cost 1.0 0.6 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.2
Sources: CSO (Series at 1993-94 prices); RBI (Series converted using implicit price deflator for GDP).
Notes:  Data on the GDP is available till 2002–03 and on other aggregates it is available till 2001–02.16
Though our focus is on the post colonial period it should be noted that this GDP
growth rate was five times the average rate of growth of 0.7% per annum during the 30
year period from 1917 to 1946.  It also represented a major jump from the –0.3% per
growth of per capita GDP during these 30 years.
14 This was however a very difficult
period in world history, with the two world wars bracketing it and the great depression in
between. The Indian economy grew at 1.5% per annum during 1900 to 1913 which was
less than half the rate during phase I of the post-independence period.  The purpose of the
present paper is not to explain this acceleration (as the development economics literature
of the time has widely done), but to identify policy failures and weakness that may have
remained uncorrected and may even persist to this day.
This phase was characterised by a conscious effort to increase the role of the state
in  the  economy.  This  was  perhaps  a  reflection  of  what  Chakravarty  (1987)  calls  a
“profoundly interventionist economic philosophy” prevailing at the time among Nehru
and other intellectuals. He states that given similar perceptions of the reasons for India’s
“structural  backwardness”,  which  he  presents,  “even  a  more  pragmatically  inclined
politician  than  Nehru  could  well  have  opted  for  the  same  set  of  arrangements  for
promoting economic development.” There was an inherent assumption that market failure
was a serious underlying problem, that the private sector could not be trusted and that the
public sector would produce economic and socially superior outcomes. The expansion of
the State’s role took place through multiple channels including nationalisation of selected
production activities, increased public investment in infrastructure and other production
activities, and legislative measures to control and direct private activity and economic
agents. Though the mix of measures used varied over the phase, the concept of modern
regulation as against bureaucratic control was sorely missing through out the first phase
of economic growth.
In this phase Investment grew strongly at 6.1% per annum led by the growth of
government  fixed  investment  at  7.2%  per  annum.    Rapid  growth  of  Government
consumption at 5.8% also far exceeded economic growth.  In contrast the growth rate of
private consumption was a very modest 3.2% per annum a rate slower than that of GDP.
                                                          
14 Based on data in Sivasubramonian (2000).17
Though  initially  government  investment  and  consumption  may  have  led  private
consumption at some point during this phase it started substituting for and crowding out
private investment and consumption.
From the supply side, a noticeable feature of this growth was the fact that the
tradable goods sector – manufacturing, mining, and agriculture – grew at about half the
rate  (2.8%  per  annum)  of  the  non-tradable  services  sector  (table  2).    Electricity
production was the leading sector in this growth (9.6% per annum)).  Other sectors with
relatively robust growth were Banking and Insurance (6.7% per annum), Communication
(6.7%), Other transport (6.3%) and registered/modern manufacturing (6.1% per annum).
Table 2: Sector Growth Rates during Different Phases
Sub-phase Sub-phase








1 Agriculture & allied 2.1% 2.9% 1.4% 3.6% 3.9% 3.3%
1.1   Agriculture 2.3% 3.1% 1.5% 3.8% 4.2% 3.3%
2 Mining 4.6% 5.6% 3.7% 6.3% 8.4% 3.8%
3 Manufacturing 5.3% 6.6% 4.1% 6.4% 6.1% 6.8%
3.1   Registered (Modern ) 6.1% 7.9% 4.4% 6.9% 6.8% 7.1%
3.2   Unregistered 4.5% 5.4% 3.7% 5.6% 5.0% 6.3%
4 Electricity, Gas, & Water 9.6% 11.2% 8.1% 7.5% 9.0% 5.7%
5 Construction 4.9% 6.8% 3.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.3%
6 Trade, Hotels, & Restaurants 4.8% 5.6% 4.0% 6.7% 5.4% 8.1%
6.1   Trade 4.8% 5.6% 4.0% 6.6% 5.4% 8.0%
6.2   Hotels & restaurants 4.8% 5.6% 4.0% 8.0% 6.1% 10.3%
7 Storage, transport, & communication 5.7% 5.9% 5.6% 7.2% 5.7% 8.9%
7.1   Railway 4.2% 4.8% 3.6% 4.2% 4.9% 3.3%
7.2   Other transport 6.3% 6.4% 6.3% 6.5% 6.0% 7.0%
7.3   Storage 5.5% 2.3% 8.5% 2.3% 2.5% 2.0%
7.4   Communication 6.7% 7.4% 6.1% 11.6% 6.3% 18.0%
8 FIREBHS 3.5% 3.1% 4.0% 8.6% 9.4% 7.7%
8.1  Banking & insurance 6.7% 6.6% 6.9% 10.6% 11.6% 9.4%
8.2  Real estate, housing & business services 2.6% 2.1% 3.0% 7.2% 8.0% 6.3%
9 Community, social, &  personal services 4.3% 4.4% 4.2% 6.3% 5.6% 7.1%
9.1   Public administration & defense 6.1% 6.6% 5.7% 6.2% 6.2% 6.3%
9.2   Other services 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 6.4% 5.2% 7.7%
Sub-aggregates
A Tradable goods 2.8% 3.6% 2.0% 4.6% 4.7% 4.5%
B Non-tradable services 4.7% 5.2% 4.2% 6.9% 6.3% 7.5%
b.1 Services, excluding FIREHBS 4.9% 5.6% 4.3% 6.5% 5.7% 7.4%
C GDP, excluding GDP administration 3.4% 4.0% 2.8% 5.7% 5.4% 6.1%
D Services excluding GDP administration 4.5% 5.0% 4.1% 6.9% 6.4% 7.6%
Source CSO (all series at 1993-94 prices)
Notes:  Data on growth by sector is available only until 2001–0218
The share of production (GDP) originating in the public sector increased rapidly
over  most  of  this  phase.  The  share  of  public  investment  on  the  other  hand  initially
increased rapidly but then fell. Despite the fall in investment during the latter years of this
phase, the government’s share of production continued to increase fairly rapidly because
of  nationalisation  of  certain  sectors.  In  addition  the  pace  of  control  of  activities
accelerated through the passage of new legislation and the introduction of more stringent
rules and more elaborate procedures.
During this 30-year period of ‘socialism with an Indian face’ we can discern two
sub-phases. In the first phase lasting till about 1964-65 the leadership was infused with
moral  righteousness  and  developmental  enthusiasm  based  on  the  philosophical
background of Fabian socialism and the experience of Soviet state socialism. The best
and brightest development economists in the world journeyed to India to advise on how
to  accelerate  development  and  growth  and  some  of  them  even  worked  in  the  Indian
government or the Planning Commission to convert ideas into practical policy.
15 In the
second sub-phase starting from 1965–66 and ending in 1979–80, both the moral fervour
and the academic certainties gradually seeped away. The policies were driven more by
immediate  crisis  and  political  expediency  than  by  economic  logic.  A  less  secure
leadership struggling to establish itself was much more inclined to use economic policy
as a political tool for besting  its  rivals
16  As  Dhar  (1990)  points  out,  this  period  saw
“incoherence in the policies of the government.” Socialistic legislation was presented as a
policy for improving the lot of the poor while its main outcome was the suppression of
market  responses  through  quantitative  controls  implemented  by  an  increasingly  self-
serving politico-bureaucratic system. Bhagwati (1993) analysed the failure of strategies
adopted  for  Indian  development  prior  to  the  nineties’  reforms.  He  argued  that  the
extensive  controls  and  the  inward-looking  policies,  which  hobbled  private  sector
efficiency, along with the substantial and inefficient public sector were the three broad
factors that stifled Indian growth in the seventies and, to a lesser extent, in the eighties.
                                                          
15 See Bhagwati and Chakravarty (1969) for a survey of some of the technical literature and Chakravarty
(1987) and the first chapter in Bhagwati (1993) for general expositions
16 Patel (2002), in his fifth chapter, describes a failed attempt by economists to ensure political stability and
a strong and united leadership for the troubled period after 1965.19
He  states  that  “the  weak  growth  performance  reflects,  not  a  disappointing  savings
performance, but rather a disappointing productivity performance.”
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1.  Phase I A: Quest for Commanding Heights
a)  Overview of Phase I A
The  first  sub-phase  of  economic  growth  stretched  15  years  from  1950–51  to
1964–65. On average 52.5% of the population was poor during this phase. In this post-
colonial period economic growth accelerated sharply to an average of 4.1% per annum
and average income grew by 2% per year (Table 1).
18 This growth was led by the modern
manufacturing  sector  and  supported  by  modern  services  such  as  electricity,
communications, banking & insurance and “other transport.” Modern manufacturing was
the leading sector in economic growth, growing at an unprecedented annual average rate
of 7.9% and contributing 17.3% to overall growth (Table 2 and Table 3).
19  Two critical
infrastructure services essential for this sector kept pace with this growth.  The electricity,
gas, and water sector grew at an even faster 11.2% per annum while the communication
sector growth at 7.4% per annum (Table 2), all from a small base.
20
The financial sector (6.6%) and ‘other transport’ which grew at 6.4% (Table 2),
complemented  the  development  of  the  modern  manufacturing  sector.  Manufacturing,
finance, and ‘other transport’ were largely private during this phase and driven by market
forces and the last partly substituted for the inadequacy of the monopoly railway sector.
b)  Sector growth
The communication and electricity sectors needed public investment to grow and
this  was  apparently  forthcoming.  The  railway  and  communication  sectors  were
                                                          
17 The fact that India’s growth rate did not rise significantly, despite an impressive savings performance,
and the implications thereof for future growth strategies has been much analysed and debated such as by
Chakravarty (1984) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1984).
18 As measured by the rate of growth of the GDP at factor cost at 1993-94 prices. The rate of growth using
the GDP-at-market-price series is 4.4% per annum.
19 Much of traditional manufacturing is in the unregistered household sector.  For expositional simplicity
we are assuming that the registered manufacturing sector is ‘modern’.
20 The former is an abbreviation for the ‘electricity, gas, and water supply’ sector as electricity is the
overwhelming component of this composite.20
monopolised by the government with 100% of the GDP from these sectors as well as
100% of the investment coming from the government in 1960–61 (Table 4). The existing
companies in the electricity, gas and water sector were allowed to continue to operate, but
all green-field investment came under the government with 87% of the GDP from this
sector and 92% of the investment in this sector coming from government in 1960–61
(Table 4). These three sectors – electricity, communication, and railways – accounted for
40.5% of government investment in 1964–65, the end of the first sub-phase.
Table 3: Sector Contribution to Overall Growth by Phase
Phase I (1950-51 to 1979-80) Phase II (1980-81 to 2001-02)
Sub-phase Sub-phase
I A I B II A II B
Sector Phase I 1951-64 1965-79 Phase II (1980-91) (1992-99)
(Contributions calculated as proportion of GDP at factor cost)
1 Agriculture & allied 23.0% 36.9% 16.8% 18.0% 21.9% 13.8%
1.1   Agriculture 21.0% 34.7% 14.6% 16.9% 20.9% 12.6%
2 Mining & quarrying 2.1% 2.2% 2.5% 2.3% 3.6% 1.6%
3 Manufacturing 16.4% 17.3% 19.4% 17.7% 20.5% 17.1%
3.1   Registered (modern) 10.2% 10.8% 12.1% 12.0% 13.9% 11.7%
3.2   Unregistered 6.2% 6.5% 7.3% 5.7% 6.6% 5.3%
4 Electricity, gas, & water supply 2.3% 1.5% 3.4% 2.8% 3.2% 2.6%
5 Construction 6.1% 7.7% 6.1% 4.9% 4.7% 4.7%
6 Trade, hotels & restaurants 13.1% 13.3% 16.0% 16.1% 13.0% 18.1%
7 Transport, storage, & communication 7.2% 5.5% 10.2% 9.3% 6.1% 11.1%
7.1   Railways 1.5% 1.6% 1.8% 0.9% 1.2% 0.8%
7.2   Other transport 4.3% 3.0% 6.4% 4.5% 3.9% 4.9%
7.3   Storage 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
7.4   Communication 1.2% 0.9% 1.7% 3.9% 1.1% 5.5%
8 FIREHBS 6.2% 4.7% 8.9% 14.8% 14.0% 15.8%
8.1   Banking & Insurance (Finance) 3.0% 2.0% 4.5% 8.1% 6.7% 9.2%
8.2  Real estate, housing, business services 3.3% 2.6% 4.6% 6.7% 7.3% 6.6%
9 Community, social, personal services 12.1% 10.4% 16.4% 14.1% 12.9% 15.1%
9.1 Public administration & defense 6.3% 4.9% 8.8% 6.1% 6.3% 6.0%
9.2 Other services 5.8% 5.3% 7.6% 8.0% 6.6% 9.1%
(Contributions calculated as proportion of GDP at market prices)
Tradable goods 41.5% 49.2% 34.9% 34.7% 40.4% 30.2%
Non-Tradable services 47.3% 37.9% 55.3% 56.6% 47.5% 62.6%
  FIREHBS 6.2% 4.7% 8.9% 14.8% 14.0% 15.8%
 Services excluding FIREHBS 41.1% 33.8% 47.3% 43.1% 35.2% 48.0%
Source CSO (all series at 1993-94 prices)
Notes:  Data on shares of each sector in the GDP is available only until 1999-2000.
Contributions are period averages.21
Table 4: Public Sector Share in GDP and GCF by Economic Sector























Sector (1960-61) (1964-65) (1979-80) (1991-92) (2000-1) (1960-61) (1964-65) (1979-80) (1991-92) (2000-1)
1 Agriculture & allied 1.6% 2.1% 3.8% 3.1% 2.7% 38.2% 45.0% 40.5% 29.2% 22.6%
1.1   Agriculture 0.7% 1.3% 3.0% 2.7% 2.4% 38.5% 45.6% 40.4% 28.9% 23.5%
2 Mining & quarrying 19.1% 26% 97.2% 90.3% 86.7% 53.8% 77.2% 70.3% 95.8% 86.1%
3 Manufacturing 7.0% 13% 15.4% 19.7% 12.1% 31.6% 28.6% 38.5% 16.1% 5.9%
4 Electricity, gas & water supply 86.9% 92% 102% 100% 100% 91.8% 89.4% 87.3% 89.6% 81.0%
5 Construction 4.6% 4.7% 13.6% 14.4% 16.4% 6.2% 13.3% 24.5% 21.8% 10.6%
6 Trade, hotels & restaurants 1.4% 2.4% 7.5% 4.8% 2.9% 2.5% 3.4% 6.5% -48% 38.9%
7 Transport, storage, &
communication 61.8% 61% 58.9% 52.4% 54.9% 57.8% 66.4% 45.8% 45.7% 56.9%
7.1   Railways 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
7.4   Communication 100% 100% 100% 96.2% 89.7% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
8 FIREHBS 6.5% 8.4% 26.0% 35.5% 30.9% 8.8% 8.3% 10.5% 15.5% 12.4%
8.1   Banking & insurance 29.2% 34% 72.5% 78.3% 58.4% 46.2% 51.3% 59.8% 46.8% 62.8%
9 Community, social, & personal
services 39.8% 46% 61.3% 66.6% 66.5% 85.2% 86.2% 91.5% 81.2% 72.5%
9.1 Public administration & defense 100% 100% 100% 97.8% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
9.2  Other services 12.3% 15.8% 30.4% 39.0% 39.5% 25.1% 23.9% 54.6% 36.0% 21.8%
All sectors (1 to 9) 9.0% 11.8% 22.1% 25.9% 25.8% 44.6% 50.1% 47.3% 38.4% 32.8%
1950-01
Total GDP from Public sector (alternative source) 26.7% 52.4% 49.2% 38.8% 25.8%
Source: CSO (all series in 1993-94 prices)
Note: Data on the public sector share in output and investment by sector is available only between 1960–61 and 2000-1.22
Agriculture (and allied sector) growth was a modest 2.9% per annum given the
low priority accorded to it in the Mahalanobis model of development (Table 2).  As a
result the tradable goods sector grew at only 3.6% per annum, half the rate of the non-
tradable sector (5.2%). The share of both manufacturing and mining increased. In this
initial phase of development government administration grew rapidly at 6.6% per annum.
This pulled up the non-tradable sector’s growth by 0.2 percentage points per annum from
the  service  sector  (excluding  administration)  growth  of  5%  per  annum.
Telecommunications in contrast became a public sector company with an independent set
of  accounts  and  the  potential  of  putting  some  distance  between  the  governments
functioning and the commercial objective of providing telephone services (Table 2).
c)  Role of the State
The role of the State in production increased inexorably through the first sub-
phase. The share of government in gross capital formation (GCF) doubled from 26.7% in
1950–51 to a peak of 53.6% in 1963–64.
21 Public share of Gross fixed capital formation
(GFCF) also doubled from 27.2% of total in 1950-51 to 54.4% in 1963–64. Government
investment was not however limited to public goods and infrastructure, as manufacturing,
and mining received 16.6% of the total gross investment by the government in 1964–65
with another 11.5% going to agriculture.
22 The government built not only large irrigation
dams  and  canal  systems  but  also  large  capital-intensive  factories;  both  termed  the
‘Temples of Modern India.’  Though at the end of phase IA the public sector’s share in
GDP from mining and manufacturing was 26% and 13% respectively, the jump in public
share in GCF to 77.2% and 32.1% (1963-64) respectively were initial steps on the road to
fiscal and financial crowding out.
23  Public investment in sectors like trade, hotels and
                                                          
21 These figures are from the CSO statement on capital formation by type of asset and institution, which
provide data from 1950–51 onwards. These differ from the figures provided in the CSO statement on
capital formation by sector, which are used for constructing Tables 4 and 6 and provide data only from
1960–61 onwards. Therefore, there may be discrepancies in the numbers cited here and in Tables 4 and 6
for comparable years.
22 The division between private goods and public infrastructure (dams and canals) is not available in the
national accounts statistics.
23 By fiscal crowding out we mean the crowding out of government expenditure on public and quasi-public
goods.  Financial crowding out refers to the effects of government borrowing on private credit and interest
rates.23
restaurants,  storage  and  real  estate,  housing  and  business  services  compounded  the
problem in subsequent years.
The monopolisation of the infrastructure sectors and the complete removal of the
threat of competition
24 from these critical infrastructure sectors laid the foundation for
future  increases  in  X-inefficiency.  The  merger  of  regulatory  functions  in  the
administrative ministries (telecom) or worse in the organisations that were operationally
responsible  for  service  delivery  (railways,  electricity),  laid  the  basis  for  progressive
neglect  of  user  interests  and  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  service.  The  institutional
structure of railways and electricity also affected the speed of deterioration. Both were
departmental undertakings whose financial accounts was part of the government budget.
Thus  the  ills  of  bureaucratic  red  tape  and  political  interference  were  multiplied  for
organisations whose ostensible objective was to supply commercial services.
The monopolisation of these sectors by the government also had the unfortunate
effect of converting a technical issue into an ideological one. The technical issue was one
of degree of complementarily between production of and investment in infrastructure (or
utility)  services  and  the  other  sectors  of  the  economy.    This  was  converted  into  an
ideological  issue  of  the  complementarily  between  public  investment  and  private
investment.  A priori one would expect that electricity and to a lesser extent modern
communications  and  transport  are  complements  to  modern  industrial  production  and
market systems. The technical possibility of complementarily or substitutability does not,
depend on whether one or other or both are private or government owned.
25  The fact that
these sectors were under government monopoly misled many economists into thinking
and arguing as if the issue was one of complementarily between private and government
investment  in  all  sectors  (i.e.  including  manufacturing,  mining,  agriculture  and  other
services).
                                                          
24 By reserving them for the public sector.
25 The best way to estimate substitutability can however depend critically on the ownership pattern and
consequently the incentives and behaviour of the managers.24
2.  Phase I B: Socialist Rate of Growth
a)   Overview of outcomes
The second sub-phase started with a severe drought in 1965–66 and was followed
five years latter by the first oil shock. The sub-phase ended in 1979–80 with one of the
worst  droughts  since  independence  coupled  with  the  second  (smaller)  oil  shock.
Economic growth collapsed to 2.9% per annum during this sub-phase, with per capita
income growing at a minuscule 0.6% per annum (Table 1). Agriculture led the downward
spiral with an average growth of 1.4% per annum, half of its growth rate in sub-phase IA
(Table 2). Given the bad monsoons, the decline in agriculture growth this is perhaps not
surprising, except when one recalls that this was also the period during which the relative
neglect of agriculture ended and the ‘Green Revolution’ was introduced into India. The
reason  for  calling  it  a  sub-phase  rather  than  the  second  growth  phase  is  because  the
decline of 0.6% point below the average of 3.5 for the entire period is not statistically
significant.
26  The  contribution  of  agriculture  to  overall  growth  fell  dramatically  from
about 35% of total growth in the first sub-phase to less than 15% in the second (Table 3).
The growth rate of modern manufacturing decelerated only a little less sharply
than agriculture to 4.4% or 0.56 of IA growth (Table 2).
27 As unregistered manufacturing
decelerated less, total manufacturing contributed 19.4% of total growth during this sub-
phase, a higher contribution than during the previous sub-phase (Table 3). The rising
share of manufacturing and declining share of agriculture was also responsible for the
former contribution exceeding the latter during this sub-phase.
Somewhat surprisingly the three service sectors that had shared the high growth
of the previous period did not decelerate as rapidly as can be seen from Table 2. The
electricity sector remained the top performer at 8.1% per annum – 0.72 of its sub-phase
IA  growth  –  while  communication  growth  decelerated  even  less  to  0.82  of  previous
levels—6.1% per annum. The banking and insurance sector was one of the few sectors
that  grew  faster  than  in  the  first  sub-phase  at  6.9%  per  annum,  because  of  policy
                                                          
26 In other words there is no statistical difference in growth during this period once monsoon fluctuations
are accounted for by using a rainfall index in the growth regression as in eq.  1.
27 See Krishna (2002) or Goldar & Mitra (2002) for a review of the extensive literature on the deceleration
in registered manufacturing growth.25
decisions  by  the  government  with  respect  to  the  banking  sub-sector  after
nationalisation.
28 The non-tradable services sector, as well as the service sector excluding
public administration, continued to grow at about twice the rate of the tradable goods
sector.
b)  Policy Change and Effect
Overall, this was an extremely volatile period of economic history.
29 The severe
droughts in 1965 and 1966 followed by the devaluation of the rupee, the oil crises of
1971, and a number of other exogenous shocks led to a re-evaluation of existing policies
and  a  re-orientation  of  development  policies.  There  were  both  positive  and  negative
features  of  this  re-orientation.  The  former  included  a  renewed  recognition  of  the
importance of agriculture and the initiation of the ‘Green Revolution’ and conservative
and successful management of the macroeconomic imbalances created by the oil shock.
There was, however, increasing resort to the rhetoric and methods of ‘State socialism’
during this phase of development.  In a country in which fairly sophisticated markets for
commodities and finance (the ‘Hundi’ system) had existed for centuries, in which there
were well developed traditional stock exchanges and forward markets for commodities at
the  turn  of  the  century,  this  represented  something  of  a  contradiction.  The  negative
features included the following.
(a) A number of laws, such as the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
(MRTP) Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) designed to control the
private sector and private economic activity
(b) The nationalisation of banks
30 and general insurance designed to supplant the
private sector by the public sector
(c) An increasing resort to licensing and controls to direct industrial investment,
imports, and agricultural exports
(d) The spread of the public sector into a variety of areas such as consulting and
consumer goods
                                                          
28 Storage sector growth more than tripled during this phase. The public sector’s share of the total GDP
from this sector was 23.3% in 1980–81, the first year for which data is available in the national account
statistics.
29 The standard deviation in growth was 4.2%, implying a CV of 1.5. This CV is 2.5 times the CV of 0.62
in sub-phase IA (Table 1).26
(e) Tightening of labour laws and procedures, such as requiring prior permission
from the state government for retrenchment in firms with 300 or more employees.
31
The inefficiency arising from this legislative-bureaucratic socialism was reflected
in the near doubling of the real ICOR (incremental capital–output ratio) for the economy
from 3.9 in the first sub-phase to 6.7 in the second sub-phase (Table 5).
32 The ICOR for
mining more than tripled from 2.1 in sub-phase IA to 6.3 in sub-phase IB, while the
ICOR for agriculture almost tripled to 5 from 1.8 in sub-phase IA (Table 5). The ICOR
for manufacturing almost doubled to 7.9 during this sub-phase from an average of 4.2 in
the first sub-phase (Table 5).
The issue of inefficient resource use or stagnation also finds supports in figures on
decadal total factor productivity growth (TFPG) and capital stock growth.
33 Using data
from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and Barro and Lee (1994), Guha-Khasnobis and Bari
(2003) find that for India, TFPG for the economy turned negative in the seventies from a
positive value in the sixties. The largest change is of 1.60 percentage points, from 1.20%
in the sixties to –0.40% in the seventies. In contrast, the growth rate of capital stock in
India remained positive and decelerated only marginally in the seventies.
34 In our view
negative TFPG growth is inconsistent with the concept of technical change that TFPG
was  initially  constructed  to  measure  and  (most  likely)  indicates  declining  capacity
utilisation of capital and other fixed factors.
35
                                                                                                                                                                            
30 See Patel (2002), chapter 5, for a description of how the nationalisation happened and the subsequent
public reaction.
31 Earlier they were only required to report to the government their intent to retrench (on a ‘last come first
go’ rule). The number of employees for this rule to apply was changed to 100 in 1982.
32 See the caveats in Srinivasan and Narayana (1977) and Raj (1984)] on using the ICOR.
33 It is not commonly recognised however, that variation in capacity utilisation will affect estimates of both
ICOR and TFPG.  Ignoring capacity utilisation is likely to yield biased estimates of TFPG as a measure of
productivity.
34 The change in the capital-stock growth estimate of Table 2.4 (corresponding to the TFPG figures in
footnote 17) is of 0.21 percentage points, from 1.70% to 1.49%.
35 When labour laws make it difficult to fire workers and/or exit is difficult regular blue-collar workers may
also be a quasi-fixed factor and would also be affected in the same way.27
Table 5: Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (period averages at 1993-94 prices)
Economy-wide Public Sector
Phase I (1951-52 to
1979-80)
Phase II (1980-81 to
2002-03)
Phase I (1951-52 to
1979-80)
Phase II (1980-81 to
2002-03)
Sub-phase Sub-phase Sub-phase Sub-phase


























1 Agriculture & allied 2.9 1.9 4.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 16.3 13.5 17.3 40.0 50.2 25.7
1.1   Agriculture 2.9 1.8 5.0 1.7 1.8 1.6 17.8 13.5 20.2 42.5 40.3 50.0
2 Mining & quarrying 3.8 2.1 6.3 6.6 6.1 8.2 2.9 3.2 2.7 8.4 7.2 14.6
3 Manufacturing 5.7 4.2 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.8 4.1 17.4 6.1 7.4 3.7
3.1   Registered (modern) 7.7 6.5 9.6 7.5 6.9 8.3 -- -- -- -- -- --
3.2   Unregistered 2.4 0.7 4.8 8.3 10.4 5.9 -- -- -- -- -- --
4 Electricity, gas & water
supply 17.2 16.2 18.4 15.8 15.7 16.0 15.0 13.4 15.3 11.8 15.1 6.9
5 Construction 1.0 0.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.3
6 Trade, hotels &
restaurants 1.6 0.8 2.7 1.1 1.5 0.7 2.0 0.5 2.7 4.5 3.5 5.9
7 Transport, storage, &
communication 12.8 14.3 11.4 6.3 7.6 5.0 11.7 16.2 9.9 7.1 8.8 5.4
7.1   Railways 23.1 27.9 17.1 10.6 8.9 15.0 21.9 30.8 17.3 11.5 9.4 18.4
7.2   Other transport 10.9 10.0 11.8 6.2 7.3 4.9 6.4 6.3 6.6 7.8 10.2 5.5
7.4   Communication 4.4 3.9 5.0 4.6 6.8 3.3 4.7 3.6 5.1 5.0 7.4 3.4
8 FIREHBS 11.3 13.8 9.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 2.1 4.4 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3
8.1   Banking & Insurance 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.9
8.2   Real estate, housing, &
business services 20.3 25.0 17.2 6.3 5.9 7.0 77.1 77.6 75.3
9 Community, social, &
personal services 5.8 6.0 5.6 3.2 3.9 2.5 6.3 6.1 6.2 4.1 4.6 3.3
9.1   Public administration
& defense 9.5 10.3 8.6 4.9 5.8 3.8 8.3 7.5 8.4 5.3 6.1 4.1
9.2   Other services 2.3 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3
Total (1 to 9) 5.1 3.9 6.7 4.1 4.3 3.9 8.1 7.7 8.0 6.1 7.0 4.6
Source CSO
Notes
1.  Data on investment by sector is available only until 1999–2000.
2.  Data for the public sector’s investment by sector is available only from 1960 onwards
c)  Impact of Expanding Public Sector
Though the public share of investment stabilised during this sub-phase, its share
of  the  GDP,  however,  continued  to  grow,  thus  increasing  the  direct  role  of  the
government in the economy and the crowding out of private activity and initiative. The
allocation of public investment worsened.  The ratio of government investment to total28
investment in the economy declined from 52% in 1964-65 to 49% in 1979-80.
36  This
was partly because the administrative infrastructure had been largely completed, allowing
the share of public investment allotted for this purpose to decline by six percentage points
(Table 6). The share of public investment going to mining and manufacturing increased
from 16.7% to 27%, an indication of distorted priorities in public investment towards
private goods and away from public goods.  Agriculture’s share of public investment also
increased by about 4 percentage points. There were contrary developments with respect
to  the  monopolised  infrastructure  or  utility  sector—the  share  of  public  investment
allocated to electricity increased to 20% while that going to railways plummeted to 6%
from 23.1% at the end of sub-phase IA (Table 6). Though this appears to be a rather
drastic cut one positive result was to cut wasteful expenditure in the railways, a fact
reflected in the dramatic decline in the ICOR for the sector to 17 from about 28 in the
previous sub-phase  (Table 5).
37 In contrast, the  ICOR in the fast  growing  utility  and
infrastructure sectors, communication and electricity increased by 1.1 point (to 5.0) and
2.2 points (to 18.4), respectively (Table 5).
Srinivasan and Narayana (1977) had a somewhat different view of government
investment,  stating  that  “if  the  Indian  economy  is  to  break  away  from  its  recent
stagnation, a return to vigorous growth in public sector investment as a part of a return to
planned development is essential.” They attribute the growth stagnation since the mid-
sixties to the downturn in public sector real GFCF after 1965–66, on the  grounds of
public  investment  driving  private  investment  profitability,  employment,  and  poverty
reduction.
38 They also point to the exhaustion of possibilities from import-substituting
industrialisation,  low  agricultural  growth,  problems  in  public-sector  management  and
operation,  non-growing  public  saving  and  declining  aid,  and  state  that  the  1966
devaluation and other liberalisation measures were not taken far enough.
                                                          
36 These figures used in this paragraph are again from the CSO statement on capital formation by type of
asset and institution.
37 The high ICOR in IA was probably due to over ambitious extension of new railway lines ignoring long
gestation lags and low traffic projections.
38 The authors note that the trends established before 1965 could not have been carried forward without
major changes in policies and acknowledge that efficiency issues are important [as in Bhagwati and Desai
(1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974)].29
















Sector (1960-61) (1964-65) (1979-80) (1991-92) (2000-1)
1 Agriculture & allied 13.1% 12.1% 15.9% 6.6% 5.3%
1.1   Agriculture 12.4% 11.5% 15.2% 5.8% 4.7%
2 Mining & quarrying 2.4% 3.4% 6.1% 10.8% 3.7%
3 Manufacturing 18.0% 13.3% 20.7% 14.5% 6.4%
4 Electricity, gas, & water supply 8.6% 14.6% 19.8% 30.3% 23.4%
5 Construction 0.4% 0.6% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7%
6 Trade, hotels, & restaurants 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% -3.0% 6.0%
7 Transport, storage, & communication 22.9% 27.6% 12.5% 16.0% 24.6%
7.1   Railways 19.1% 23.1% 5.8% 5.8% 4.7%
7.2   Other transport 2.3% 2.0% 4.2% 4.5% 3.2%
7.3   Storage 0.0% 1.0%
7.4   Communication 1.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5.6% 15.8%
8 FIREHBS 2.6% 1.9% 2.2% 5.5% 4.9%
8.1   Banking &Insurance 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 4.0% 3.3%
8.2   Real estate, housing,, & business services 2.2% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% 1.6%
9 Community, social, & personal services 31.9% 26.3% 21.0% 18.7% 25.0%
9.1   Public administration & defense 30.0% 25.0% 18.7% 16.3% 22.4%
9.2   Other services 1.9% 1.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.6%
Total (1 to 9) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
Source CSO (all series in 1993-94 prices)
Notes: Data on sector shares in public sector investment is available only between 1960–61 and 2000-1.
The share of the public sector in total GDP almost doubled during sub-phase IB to
22.1% from 11.8% at the end of the previous sub-phase (table 4).  This was due to a
tripling of the share in mining to 97% and in trade hotels & restaurants to 7.3%, and a
more  than  doubling  in  agriculture  (to  3%),  construction  (to  13.6%)  and  Banking  &
Insurance (to 72.5).  In other community, social & personal services it almost doubled to
30.4%.   Thus  the  direct  role  of  the  government  in  production  of  goods  and  services
expanded vigorously during this sub-phase and along with the legislative and procedural
control stifled private initiative, entrepreneurship and innovation.
d)  Throttling Manufacturing
Ahluwalia (1985, 1991) has analysed the stagnation in growth of value added in
the registered manufacturing sector (ASI & IIP) since the mid-sixties and the turnaround
in growth in early eighties in terms of trends in TFPG growth in this sector. We analysed
in a qualitative way the effect of the “socialist” policies introduced during phase IB on
the manufacturing and other sectors of the economy.  The question that we address here30
is the quantitative impact of the “socialist” policies, as well as the lagged effect of similar
policies introduced in the previous phase, on growth of GDP from manufacturing.  A
dummy for the period 1965-6 to 1979-80 (D6579) is introduced into equation (4a).  Its
co-efficient is found to be significant at the 10% level.  The best fit is however found
with the dummy for 1965-6 to 1980-81 (D6580) whose co-efficient is highly significant:
(4c) GrGman = 0.066 + -0.0252*D6580+ 0.114*DrainMean
(12.1)    (-2.54)                 (2.53)
      R
2 = 0.228, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.196, DW = 1.74.
This equation establishes that there was a reduction of 2.5% per annum in the growth rate
of manufacturing during 1965-6 to 1980-81.  In general this could have been due either to
the policies we followed or to external/exogenous factors.    In  our  view  the  policies
followed  during  sub-phase  IB  (1965-6  to  1979-80)  reduced  the  rate  of  growth  of
manufacturing by 2.5% points during the period 1965-6 to 1980-81. If we compare this
equation with (4b) containing the dummy D81 (1981-2 to 2002-3) we find that the (4c)
has greater explanatory power.  Further when both dummys are included simultaneously
D6580 has greater significance than D81.
39 This suggests that the removal of some of the
constraints/barriers to growth imposed during 1965-6 to 1979-80 had a greater role in the
acceleration of manufacturing growth from 1981-82 than the stimulation of new growth
impulses from 1981-82 onwards.  We will examine this issue below in greater detail.
e)  Governance Impact
This sub-phase of legislative-bureaucratic socialism and the political and other
developments that took place during this period, set in motion a gradual deterioration in
formal government institutions.  The effect of this deterioration in governance is with us
to this day.
                                                          
39 T= 1.57 (prob=12.3%) versus t=0.67 (prob=50%)31
C.  Phase II: Bharatiya Rate of Growth
1.  Introduction
The second phase of economic growth started at the beginning of the eighties. The
high growth rates during 1994-95 to 1996-97 led to widespread speculation and assertion
that India had entered a new phase of growth and development with enactment of radical
new economic policy framework in 1991-92.
40  It is therefore important to determine
whether a new phase started in 1991 or 1992 or whether the phase that started in 1980–81
continues till today. We can test this statistically by introducing a dummy for the period
1991–92  to  2002–03  (D91+)  or  for  the  period  1992–93  to  2002–03  (D92+)  into  the
growth equation (1). These dummies are found to be statistically insignificant, suggesting
that the growth phase that started in 1980–81 continues till today.  We therefore treat the
entire period since 1980-81 as a single phase, but divide it into two sub-phases.
2.  Macro perspective
During  the  period  1980–81  to  2002–03  economic  growth  averaged  5.7%  per
annum (Table 1). This rate is 1.2 percentage point higher than that during the first phase
of  development.  It  is  2.8  percentage  points  higher  than  that  in  the  sub-phase  IB.
Economic growth during this phase has been remarkably stable with a CV of only 0.3,
one-third of the CV during the first phase of development (Table 1). We call this the
‘Bharatiya rate of growth’, to distinguish it from the 3.5% average rate of growth during
the first phase of development, a rate that has come to be associated in most peoples
minds as the ‘Hindu rate of growth,’ but is more accurately called “Hindu-socialist” or
“Indian-socialist.” Per capita income has been growing at 3.6% per annum during the
Bharatiya rate of growth phase, more than double the per capita income growth of 1.3%
per annum during the Hindu-socialist rate of growth phase.
 The Bharatiya growth phase has been characterised by recognition of the harmful
effects of industrial and other controls on distribution, production, and investment and the
need to remove the distortions created by government policy on the industry and exports.
There was much more gradual and hesitating recognition of the problem of government
                                                          
40 For instance in Investment Bank research reports and economic newspapers and magazine.32
and public sector failure. This was reflected in the 0.5% point step up in the rate of
growth of government consumption to 6.3% (from 5.8%).
The step up in the growth rate during the BRG phase has been led, on the demand
side,  by  an  increase  in  private  consumption,  whose  growth  accelerated  to  4.7%  per
annum from 3.2% per annum in the HRG phase.  The acceleration of export growth to
9.5% per annum, over 2½ times the earlier growth rate of 3.8% per in HRG contributed
to the acceleration, even though part of this may have been offset by higher oil import bill
due to rising prices. Investment growth remained virtually unchanged at 6.3% per annum
relative  to  6.1%  earlier.  The  fact  that  growth  accelerated  despite  this  small  change
implies that the efficiency of investment must have improved during the BRG phase.
This is supported by a  change in  the  structure  of  investment  towards  machinery  and
investment, whose growth accelerated to 8.9% per annum during the BRG phase from
6.6% per annum during the HRG phase. The rate of growth of private fixed investment
more than doubled from 3.6% in the HRG phase to 8.5% per annum in the BRG phase.
With  completely  different  objective  function  of  profit  maximisation  (versus  political
support maximisation in public sector) this would have contributed to the efficiency of
capital use.
3.  Potential Sub-phases
The second phase of development can be divided into two sub-phases. In the first
sub-phase (IIA), exchange management, tax, and tariff policies continued their earlier
trajectories.  It  was only during the second sub-phase (IIB) that  there  was  a  quantum
change  in  approach,  with  a  much  clearer  articulation  of  the  reform  philosophy  and
acceleration  in  actual  economic  reform  measures.  The  relative  CV  falls  sharply  after
1990–91, while the relative mean rose, a phenomenon also observed in between sub-
phases IA and IB (Figure 4). From this perspective the first sub-phase ended in 1990–91
and the new one began in 1991–92.
There  is,  however  an  alternative  dividing  line  based  on  growth.  From  this
perspective, the low growth rate in 1991–92 is linked to the policy mistakes during earlier
years and the problems accumulated as a result of such policies. These mistakes and33
problems cannot be corrected instantaneously; there is a lag of about a year for any new
policy  to  take  effect.  Thus,  any  change  in  policy  during  1991–92  would  only  affect
growth in 1992–93.
41  From this perspective the new growth phase would begin in 1992–
93, after the old growth phase ended in 1991–92.  We replace D80+ in equation (1) by
two dummies, D8091 for the period 1980–91 and D92+ for the period after 1992-2002
and find both significant. This has slightly greater explanatory power
42 than if D80+ is
replaced by the dummies D8090 for the period 1980–90 and D91+ for the period after
1991-2002. In our view this division into sub-periods is more appropriate for evaluating
the effect of policies – good and bad – on the economy. For the moment we adopt this
division into sub-phases, and will return to the first approach subsequently.
A third commonly used approach to study crises is to leave out the main crisis
year along with the year in which reforms are initiated, and lump these together as the
crisis years.  Comparisons are then made between the pre-crisis and post-crisis years.  As
our objective is to study the growth trends over fifty years and not to study the crisis per
se, we do not pursue this approach.
43
D.  Phase II A: Modest Reform
The first sub-phase of the second (BRG) phase of development started after one
of the worst droughts and ended after the BOP crisis of 1990–91. During this phase, the
process of reform was very selective and case by case. As K.N. Raj (1986), pointed out
there was no official resolution or statement about the ‘new economic policy’, which saw
“certain changes in policy initiated in stages over the last several months.” The pace of
reform was quite slow, held back by severe bureaucratic and political inertia. This inertia
was certainly linked to and perhaps caused by the democratic system prevailing in India.
Williamson & Zagha (2002) used the term ‘Hindu rate of reform’ to describe the entire
                                                          
41 In fact in most countries across the world in which such balance of payments (BOP) crises have
occurred, the recovery has taken at least two years.
42 The R-square and adjusted R-square values are higher.
43 Acharya (2001), in comparing the period from1950-51 to 1980-81 with the eighties and nineties, states
that “Some commentators believe that the growth in the crisis year of 1991/92 should be included in the
earlier, “pre-crisis” period (which would pull down that average to 5.3 per cent) on the grounds that the
crisis was a direct result of the policies and trends in the eighties. Others, such as Williamson, feel that
1991/92 growth belongs in the latter period because of “slack built up during the crisis”. My preferred
option of omitting 1991/92 from both periods would seem to be a reasonable compromise.”34
process of reform including that in the nineties.  In our view this term is more appropriate
for the reform undertaken during the eighties, when only the most glaring and obvious
distortions introduced by government intervention, on which there was broad consensus
among economic analysts, were corrected.
1.  Policy Reform
Industrial  de-licensing  measures  included  automatic  endorsement  of  capacity
expansion up to 25% of licensed capacity, broad banding of industrial licenses,
44 de-
reservation of 40 industries, and rise in the size limit (value of output/sales) defining
small-scale industry (SSI). The cement and aluminium industries, which were subject to
price, distribution, and investment control, were de-licensed. In 1985, firms with assets
below Rs. 5 crore were de-licensed subject to certain conditions. This limit was raised to
Rs. 15 crore in 1988. The scope for large industrial groups was expanded over time by a
gradual rise in the limit below which MRTP clearance was not required for investment
(Rs. 100 crore). This was sorely needed to increase competition in the economy, which
was being stifled by vested interests to increase their monopolistic power, with the MRTP
being “reduced to the proverbial ‘grin without a cat’ in Alice in Wonderland”, as K.N.
Raj  (1986)  put  it.  The  scope  for  diversification  and  expansion  of  capacity  for  the
industries under investment licensing was gradually expanded.
45  There was virtually no
reform in other production sectors such as mining and agriculture.
Imports  of  capital  goods  were  made  procedurally  easier  through  licensing  of
imports  for  modernisation  and  export  industries.  Intermediate  imports  were  gradually
moved from licensing to tariff protection and made available for export production at
lower or zero duty.
46  Tax rates declined slowly from the absurd highs they had reached
in the seventies (such as an over-100% marginal rate on income from assets, inclusive of
wealth tax) and modified value-added tax (MODVAT) credit was introduced into the
excise  tax.  The  control  regime,  however,  continued  to  be  extended  in  areas  such  as
exchange management and import tariffs continued to rise.
                                                          
44 This was done in stages to include 28 industry groups by 1986.
45 According to Raj (1986), the main thrust of the mid-eighties policy changes was the greater scope for
expansion it offered the private sector and the opportunities opened up thereby for multinationals.
46 Tariff rates on manufactured goods increased during the first half of the eighties.35
2.  Outcome: Macro perspective
Sub-phase IIA covered the period from 1980–81 to 1991–92. During this sub-
phase  economic  growth  has  averaged  5.5%  per  annum,  only  0.2  percentage  points
different from the 5.7% rate for the full second growth phase (Table 1). As a result of the
policy reforms, Investment (gross capital formation) growth accelerated marginally from
4.5% per annum in sub-phase IB to 5% in sub-phase IIA.  More important than the size
of the increase was the change in the structure of investment. The  rate of  growth of
investment in Machinery and equipment more than doubled from 3.7% per annum during
sub-phase IB to 9.9% per annum during sub-phase IIA.  This raised the average share of
machinery in gross fixed capital formation by 15.4% points between the two phases. As
shown by De Long & Summers (1991, 1992, 1993) equipment investment is strongly co-
related with long run growth.  Hendricks (2000) models the effect of equipment prices
and equipment investment.  We find that the relative price of machinery declined by
0.8% per annum during sub-phase IIA after rising by 2.2% per annum during IB.  The
opening  of  capital  good  imports  likely  improved  the  quality  (in  terms  of  embodied
technology)  of  capital  goods  and  put  some  competitive  pressure  on  domestic  capital
goods producers.  Though the nominal price of imported capital goods may have been
higher (thus moderating the decline) the quality-adjusted price of capital goods may have
fallen  even  more.    Thus  the  increase  in  investment  in  machinery  and  the  greater
availability and use of higher quality equipment imports were important factors in the
acceleration in growth during this phase.
 47
There was also a sharp acceleration in the rate of growth of private investment
from 3.5% per annum during sub-phase IB to 8.4% per annum during sub-phase IIA. The
share of private investment consequently increased by 10.9% points between 1964-5 and
1979-80 (i.e. over IIA).
48  The increased role of the private sector also contributed to the
acceleration in the growth rate.  For the entire economy, the TFPG figures  given in
Guha-Khasnobis and Bari (2003) turned positive in the eighties, with the largest change
being of 2.90 percentage points, from –0.40% in the seventies to 2.50% in the eighties.
                                                          
47 As shown by Delong & Summers (1991) machinery investment is an important driver of economic
growth.
48 The average share of the Private sector in gross fixed capital formation however decreased by 2.8%
points between these two periods because of several trend reversals over 1964-5 to 1980-81.36
3.  Sector growth and the Public Sector
The  growth  of  the  banking  and  insurance  sector  accelerated  even  further  to
11.6%, resulting in its becoming the fastest growing sector (Table 2).
49 Its contribution to
overall growth increased to 7% from 4% in sub-phase IB (Table 3) and it attracted much
more public investment during this phase reaching 4.0% of total public GCF in 1991–92,
up from 0.5% in 1979–80 (Table 4). The decline in the share of public investment in the
banking and insurance sector from 60% in 1979–80 to 47% in 1991–92 suggests that the
role of the private sector also started expanding (Table 4).  The share of the public sector
in the GDP from banking and insurance lagged this decline in investment.  It rose to a
peak of 81.5% in 1988–89 before starting to decline.
The decision of the government to allocate more of its investment budget to the
banking and insurance sector is however questionable, as the ICOR and non-performing
assets (NPAs) increased during this sub-phase.  The ICOR increased by 50% during this
sub-phase to 0.6 (from 0.4 in previous sub-phase).  The NPAs of the banking sector also
expanded  during  this  period.    With  the  introduction  of  income  and  capital  adequacy
norms in 1992 the regulators found that banks had accumulated a large stock of NPAs.
Given the political interference,  “loan melas”, etc. during sub-phase IIA, it is likely that
a substantial part of the outstanding NPAs on March 31, 1992 were generated during this
phase.  Thus the expansion of public banking as measured by the GDP from the public
sector overstates the net benefits of public banking as the cost of the NPAs generated in
sub-phase IIA were paid in sub-phase IIB
Electricity  sector  growth  accelerated  to  9%  per  annum  based  on  a  substantial
increase in the share of public investment going to this sector, from 20% in 1979–80 to
30% in 1991–92 (Table 2 and Table 5). The ICOR for electricity declined to 15.7 during
this  sub-phase  close  to  the  sub-phase  IA  level  of  16.2  and  sharply  down  from  the
excessive levels reached in sub phase IB (Table 5).
Mining sector growth also accelerated to 8.4%, the third highest sector growth
rate (Table 2). Mining presented a mixed picture during this sub-phase. The government
or public share of the GDP in mining declined to about 90% in 1991–92 (from 96% in37
1979-80)  while  its  share  in  the  GCF  increased  to  about  96%  from  70%  in  1979–80
(Table 4). Thus, the ICOR for public sector mining more than doubled during this sub-
phase to 7.2 from 2.7 in sub phase IB, even though the overall ICOR declined marginally
because  of  the  improved  performance  of  the  private  sector  (Table  5).  Thus,  the
government’s virtual monopoly of the mining sector continued to be a burden on the
economy during sub-phase IIA.
Agricultural growth recovered to 4.2% per annum and contributed 21% to total
economic  growth  even  with  a  reduced  share  of  agriculture  (Tables  2  and  3).  The
improved growth rate probably resulted from the lagged effect of the green revolution,
the steady spread of high-yielding varieties across the country complemented by better
monsoons. Overall utilisation in agriculture improved dramatically, as reflected in the
return of the ICOR for the sector to a normal level of 1.8 in this sub-phase, from 5 in sub-
phase IB (Table 5). However, the public sector’s ICOR in agriculture doubled to 40, from
20  in  sub-phase  IB,  highlighting  the  increasing  inefficiency  of  the  public  production
system (Table 5).
4.  Role of Demand and Supply factors
Registered manufacturing growth picked up substantially to 6.8% per annum with
a sharp reduction in the ICOR to 6.9 from the previous sub-period’s 9.6 (Tables 2 and 6).
The ICOR in public sector manufacturing also declined to 7.4, from over 17 (Table 5).
Consequently, the contribution of manufacturing to economic growth equalled that of
agriculture  during  this  period  (21%)  (Table  3).  Such  a  sharp  reduction  in  the  ICOR
suggests that demand constraints played a role in pushing up the ICOR in sub-phase IB
and these constraints were reduced or removed in sub-phase IIA.
 50 Part of this stimulus
could have come from the acceleration of real government consumption expenditure to
6% per annum during sub-phase IIA from 5.1% per annum during sub-phase IB (Table
1).  The conventional wisdom is that it indeed came from the increase in the fiscal deficit,
which for the central government grew from an average of 4.1% of GDP in sub-phase IB
                                                                                                                                                                            
49 See Gordon and Gupta (2003) for an analysis of the Service sector.
50 Whether these are ‘structural domestic demand constraints’ as emphasised by Chakravarty (1984) or
those induced by ‘lack of policy or failure of policy’ and ‘export demand constraints’ as emphasised by38
to 7.7% of GDP in sub-phase IIA.
51  Half to 2/3
rd of this, however spilled over into the
external account (Virmani (2001)), with the current account deficit more than doubling
from 0.7% of GDP in IB to 1.8% of GDP in sub-phase IIA (table 7). To the extent that
this spill over was directly linked with debt financed import of defence equipment it
constituted  a  future  burden  on  the  economy.    On  the  domestic  side,  inflation  (WPI)
declined from 10.7% per annum in IB to 8.6% per annum in IIA. It is therefore possible
that the (domestic component of the) fiscal deficit, in the presence of excess capacity,
could have (temporarily) increased the growth rate through better capacity utilisation.
Another more important factor in our view was a supply-side stimulus. The sharp
increase in oil prices and the consequent increase in the oil bill since early seventies acted
like a tax on the Indian economy. The real oil import bill paid by the citizens of India
increased by an average of 37% per annum during sub-phase IB, while it increased by
only  6.9%  per  annum  during  sub-phase  IIA  (Table  1).  Thus,  the  huge  transfer  of
resources  to  the  Organisation  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)  during  sub-
phase IB was reduced to a fraction during sub-phase IIA. This would in principle leave
more purchasing power in the hands of Indians during the latter sub-phase relative to that
in the former and provide a supply-side stimulus equivalent to a tax reduction.
52 This is
confirmed by the acceleration in the growth of real private consumption expenditure to
4.5% per annum during sub-phase IIA, from 2.8% per annum during sub-phase IB and
3.7% in sub-phase IA (Table 1). A decline in the relative price of imported oil reduced
the implicit (foreign) tax on the private sector stimulating private consumption. As a
consequence, inflation declined and capacity utilisation probably increased during this
sub-phase.
Another consequence of the growth recovery in agriculture, manufacturing, and
mining was the narrowing of the growth differential between tradable and non-tradable
goods.  During this sub-phase, tradable goods production grew by 4.7% per annum while
                                                                                                                                                                            
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1984), Srinivasan and Narayana (1977), and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) is a
question that needs to be answered.
51 As represented by the World Bank country reports on India. See also Joshi and Little (1994).
52 Conventional wisdom has focussed on the stimulus provided by the rising fiscal deficit during the
eighties as an explanation for the rise in the growth rate, but a growth rate that high could not be sustained
for this very reason.39
non-tradable services grew by 6.3% per annum (Table 2). This gap was narrower than
that during any previous sub-phase.
5.  Acceleration Puzzle and Solutions
A  question  that  analysts  have  started  raising  over  the  last  few  years  (without
providing an answer) is how what appears to outside observers to be limited reforms in
the eighties could produce such dramatic changes in the growth rate. One factor identified
earlier is the ostensibly export-linked liberalisation of capital goods imports, under the
Export Promotion Guarantee Scheme, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the import
of  capital  goods  generally  [Virmani  (2001)].  Such  imports  of  embodied  technology
played a role in the enhanced growth rate. Another factor that has been identified in this
paper  is  the  change  in  the  structure  of  investment  from  structures  to  machinery  &
equipment. The third factor in our view was the credibility  of  the  reforms  that  were
introduced.    The  fourth  factor  (discussed  below)  is  the  under-  performance  of  the
economy during sub-phase IB, which increased the gap between the potential and actual
GDP. 
53   This combined with the fiscal stimulus and the supply side impact of the slower
rise in oil prices to increase capacity utilisation.
The growth gap can be very crudely estimated as follows: Let us assume that the
4.1%  average  growth  rate  of  the  economy  during  sub-phase  IA  represented  the
underlying  growth  potential  of  the  economy  during  this  period.
54  Thus,  because  of
various reasons including bad policies, the economy under-performed by 1.2% per year
during sub-phase IB. At the end of the 15 years of this sub-phase, the economy had an
output gap, which could potentially add 18 percentage points or about 1.5% per annum to
the growth rate over the next 12 years if these wrong policies could be reversed. This
would have resulted in a growth rate that was almost identical to that actually seen in sub-
phase IIA.
Alternatively, we can focus on the tradable goods sector where the output gap was
present and the growth potential concentrated. This result is replicated in the tradable
                                                          
53 A third, not mutually exclusive possibility is that production from non-licensed capacity that had been
built up ‘illegally’ gradually started to be declared officially as it began to be allowed officially.40
goods sector, which under-performed by 1.6% per annum during sub-phase IB relative to
sub-phase IA, i.e., by 24 percentage points cumulative  (Table 2). Thus the output gap in
this sector had the potential to raise the growth rate of the GDP from tradable goods to
4.6% per annum during the next 12 years, which is exactly what happened during sub-
phase IIA—the actual growth rate was 4.7% per annum. The limited liberalisation that
took  place  in  the  eighties  was  directed  at  the  tradable  goods  sector,  particularly
manufacturing. To this extent, the above explanation is linked to the one in Virmani
(2001).  The statistical analysis in equation 4b confirms that the change in the policy
regime  starting  in  1980-81  had  lifted  the  depressing  effect  of  the  “socialist”  policy
rhetoric on manufacturing growth.  Thus the growth of manufacturing was by 1981-2
back on the track established during 1950-51 to 1964-65.
The story is similar, but not identical in the non-tradable services sector, whose
growth rate increased by 2.1 percentage points between sub-phase IB and sub-phase IIA
(Table 2).  The acceleration was even higher at 2.3 percentage points if we exclude the
GDP from public administration from this sector (Table 2). A deeper examination of the
service sectors shows that only one sub-sector – ‘Banking, Insurance, Real Estate and
Housing, and Business Services’ (FIREHBS) – shows a different pattern. The growth rate
of all other services taken together declined from 5.6% per annum in sub-phase IA to
4.3% in sub-phase IB and then recovered to 5.7% per annum in sub-phase IIA (Table 2).
In contrast the FIREHBS sub-sector accelerated from 3.5% per annum in phase I to 8.6%
in phase II (Table 2).  Its growth rate was faster in sub-phase IB (4%) than in sub-phase
IA (3.1%) followed by an unprecedented 9.4% per annum during sub-phase IIA (Table
2).  Within the FIREHBS sub-sector, the growth rate of Banking (finance) and Insurance
(FI)  as  well  as  of  Real  Estate,  personal  Housing,  and  Business  Services  (REHBS)
accelerated between sub-phases IB and IIA (Table 2).  This provided the new growth
impulse to the service sector that we have statistically identified as having started from
1984-5 or 1985-6.
The  credibility  of  the  reforms  instituted  during  the  1980s  was  very  high  for
several reasons.  The same leader, who had instituted the earlier control policies that
                                                                                                                                                                            
54 The alternative would be to assume that the average growth rate during phase I of 3.5% represented the41
slowed  the  economy,  was  changing  the  direction  of  economic  policy.      As  she  was
perceived to have learnt from her own experience, the changes were more credible to
both potential beneficiaries and losers.  To  the  latter  she  could  say,  I  introduced  the
policies that you wanted but they need to be changed now.  Her surprising come back
after  a  period  in  the  wilderness  made  her  unchallenged  in  her  own  party,  virtually
silencing any internal critics till her death.
55  Her victory also shocked the opposition into
silence, as it was so unexpected.  In any case many in the opposition had been critics of
her  earlier  policies  and  could  not  reverse  their  position  without  losing  their  own
credibility.    Whatever  reforms  were  introduced  was  seen  as  examples  of  the  new
direction she was setting.  These would determine the future economic environment so
critical for investment decisions.  Economic agents could see the economic policy clearly
beginning  to  turn  around  and  realised  that  it  would  like  a  large  oil  tanker  changing
direction,  take  time  for  it  face  in  the  opposite  direction.  This  view  was  further
strengthened by a much younger man taking over the reigns of government on her death
as  it  was  widely  hoped  that  he  would  make  the  transformation  to  a  modern  market
economy even faster.  This hope was reflected in the fact that despite limited experience
of governance he received an unprecedented and overwhelming majority in parliament.
56
In the discussion of sub-phase IB it was noted that government institutions started
to deteriorate during this sub-phase.  According to the institutional literature this would
tend  to  reduce  the  rate  of  growth.    Virmani  (2004)  has  shown  that  paradoxically  a
deterioration in the quality of institutions may increase the rate of growth (termed the
‘Governance paradox’).  The paper categorises government institutions into three types
and  shows  that  a  deterioration  in  the  quality  and  efficiency  of  one  type  (market
substituting  institutions  implementing  market  distorting  policies)  will  have  a  positive
effect on growth.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is indeed what happened during
sub-phase IIA as firms started to evade the control regime and the market substituting
institutions started to collude with them.
57
                                                                                                                                                                            
potential. In this case 4.85% annum would result from catch-up and only 0.65% from new measures.
55 The importance of this factor will become apparent when we analyse phase IIB.
56 Some observers attribute this primarily to the sympathy vote.
57 The most prominent (alleged) case was of a company that imported and built a petrochemical plant of
twice the size given in the import license and the investment/production license.42
To summarise, the policy framework that was responsible for the slowdown of
growth started to change during the eighties and its enforcement also slackened due to
deterioration in governance.  Even though individual policy reforms were incremental
(‘tinkerisation’)  rather  than  revolutionary,  remaining  controls  and  restrictions  also
started to be evaded thus resulting in greater de-facto (as against de-jure) de-control.
They were also politically credible signals of the intent to reform failed policies. This had
an impact on the investment environment leading to more private investment and a shift
from  building  of  structures  towards  machinery  and  equipment.  The  opening  of  the
economy to capital goods imports magnified the impact that they had on the efficiency of
investment. In addition the output gap that had opened up during the previous sub-phase
provided  an  opportunity  for  catch-up  growth  or  an  upturn  in  the  growth  cycle.    An
increase  in  the  fiscal  deficit,  which  stimulated  government  consumption  and  a
deceleration  of  growth  in  oil  prices,  which  stimulated  private  consumption,  in  the
presence of unused capacity put the economy on the recovery leg of the growth cycle and
(at least temporarily) accelerated growth.
E.  Phase IIB: Broader Reform
The second sub-phase (IIB) began in 1992–93 with external reforms coupled with
the macroeconomic response to the BOP crisis.
58  These reforms led to a quick recovery
and an investment and manufacturing boom not seen in India’s economic history. After
the initiation of the nineties reforms. The trend rate of growth as measured by the HP-
filtered series exceeded 6% for five years, which was unprecedented, and there were four
years in which the five-year moving average of the growth rate exceeded 6.5%, which
was again unprecedented. The boom was however short-lived and growth soon reverted
back to the ‘Bharatiya rate of growth.’ Nevertheless, growth during this sub-phase has
averaged about 6.1% per annum—0.6 percentage point higher than during sub-phase IIA.
The co-efficient of variation of growth also halved during this sub-phase compared to
IIA thus showing an improvement in what has been termed as the “Quality of growth”
(Table 1).
                                                          
58 The reforms have been documented and analysed by Chopra, Collyns, Hemming, et al (1995), Joshi and
Little (1994), Ahluwalia and Little (1998), Srinivasan (2000), Acharya (2001), Virmani (2001), and
Williamson and Zagha (2001) among others.43
1.  Macro overview
The rate of growth of both private and government consumption increased only
marginally during this sub-phase. Growth of export of goods and services accelerated to
10.8% from 8.4% per annum in the previous sub-phase. The small increase in the growth
stimulus provided by the faster export growth was however countered by a doubling of
the rate of growth of the oil import bill to 15.7% per annum, from 6.9% (Table 1).
59
The rate of growth of investment accelerated by 3.8% points to 7.8% per annum.
Though fixed investment in machinery continued to grow at a fast clip of 7.9% this was
2%  point  lower  than  in  sub-phase  IIA  (table  1).  Nevertheless  the  average  share  of
machinery in fixed investment in IIB was 10% point higher than in IIA.  Most of this
increase came from private investment as the growth of public investment in machinery
decelerated  dramatically.    The  share  of  private  investment  in  fixed  investment
consequently increased from 52.6% in IIA to 67.6% in IIB.  As shown in Virmani
(2001)  growth  in  import  of  capital  goods  also  decelerated.  The  growth  of  fixed
investment  in  manufacturing,  that  had  accelerated  sharply  during  sub-phase  IIA
decelerated somewhat to 9.7% per annum during IIB, despite an acceleration in the rate
of growth of registered manufacturing to 12.8% per annum.  GFCF growth in Mining &
quarrying also collapsed during IIB. Gross fixed capital formation in agriculture, which
had collapsed from its green revolution boom of 5% per annum during IB to 1.3% during
IIA  withered  to  0.6%  per  annum  during  IIB.  The  deceleration  in  tradable  sector
investment growth may have (temporarily) affected productivity growth.
Import  controls, quantitative restrictions and protective custom  tariffs  declined
during sub-phase IIB.  Peak tariff rates, which had risen to 150% by 1990-91, had been
reduced to 30% in 2002-3 and to 25% in 2003-4.
60  The net effect on protection was a
combination of this reduction and offsetting changes in the nominal exchange rate.  The
reduction  in  protection  of  manufactured  goods  and  minerals  would  have  led  to  a
depreciation of the real exchange rate i.e. a fall in the price of tradable goods relative to
that  of  non-tradable  goods.    We  would  therefore  expect  to  find  during  an  initial
                                                          
59 The rupee values of exports and imports have been deflated using the GDP deflator.
60 There were a few items up to 300% during 1990-91.  In 2003-4 the tariff rate on the automobile sector, a
dozen agricultural goods and alcoholic beverages exceeded 25%.44
adjustment period, a reduction in the rate of growth of tradable goods relative to the rate
of growth of non-tradable services. This is what happened.  The growth of the tradable
goods  sector  decelerated  to  4.5%  during  IIB,  while  that  of  the  non-tradable  services
sector accelerated to 7.5%, the highest level of any sub-phase. The growth of the services
sector excluding government administration accelerated to 7.5% per annum, from 6.4%
in sub-phase IIA (Table 2).  Consequently the share of tradable goods in GDP declined
by 8.4% points over sub-phase IIB compared to a decline of 4.9% points over sub-phase
IIA.
2.  Growth Impulse
To test the statistical significance of the (temporary) growth boom we estimate
equation (2) for the period 1980-1 to 2002-3 (phase II) with a dummy for 1994-5 to 1996-
7:
(6) GrGDPfc = 0.0559+0.016*D9496 +0.139*DrainMean –0.083*DrainMean(-1)
(19.9) (2.1) (5.1) (-2.9)
 R
2 = 0.892, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.644, DW =1.68.
The dummy is found to be significant at the 5% level of confidence.  The confidence
level falls to 10% if D9496 is replaced by a dummy for 1994-4 to 1999-2000 (or 1998-
99).
61  Alternative dummy variables starting from 1993-4 are not found to be significant
at the 10% level.  Interestingly the dummy D9497 for 1994-5 to 1997-98 is insignificant,
indicating that something happened during 1997-98 to bring the boom to a halt.  One
possibility is that the change of government during the year undermined the credibility of
reforms.
62  This is not surprising given the fall of a government widely perceived as
reform oriented  and  its  replacement  with  one  in  which  many  members  still  used  the
rhetoric of phase IB socialism. There was apparently some recovery thereafter as another
government that was traditionally perceived as relatively pro-market/anti-Statist came to
power.
63
                                                          
61 These dummy when introduced into equation (2) and estimated for the full 52 year period are not
however statistically significant at the 10% level.
62 United front coalition government.
63 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP).45
We repeat this exercise by inserting the same dummy(s) into the growth equation
4(b) for manufacturing.
(7) GrGman = 0.063 - 0.0216*D6580 + 0.046*D9496 + 0.106*DrainMean
           (11.5)   (-2.25)                 (2.41)                 (2.46)
      R
2 = 0.31, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.268, DW = 1.92.
D9496  the  dummy  for  the  period  1994-5  to  1996-97  is  very  significant  but  D9497,
D9498 and D9499 are not.
Similarly in the equation for non-tradable service growth equation (5b), D9496 is
not  significant  but  the  dummy  D9599  for  the  period  1995-6  to  1999-2000  is  highly
significant.
 (8a)  GrGntrdbl = 0.0475 + 0.022*D85 + 0.017*D9599 + 0.063*DrainMean
   (19.1)      (4.6)              (2.25)                (3.09)
      R
2 = 0.516, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.486, DW = 1.67.
This  is  however  no  longer  true  if  we  use  (5c)  the  equation  for  services  excluding
government administration (GrGerv).  None of these dummies are found to be significant.
These results suggest that the economic reforms of the early nineties imparted
an additional growth impulse to the manufacturing sector.  This led the growth boom
of Indian economy during 1994-95 to 1996-7. The boom however petered out in 1997-
8.  The reasons for this are explored further below.
3.  Relative Sector Performance
Within  the  service  sector  the  depth  of  de-licensing  and  decontrol  affected  the
speed  and  degree  with  which  private  investment  and  production  expanded.    The
communication sector with a phenomenal growth rate of over 18% per annum can be
called the leading sector in this sub-phase of growth (Table 2). Given its small size it
contributed only about 5% to overall growth; this is however five times its contribution in
the sub-phase  IIA  (Table  3).  Clearly  the  breaking  of  the  government  monopoly  over
telecom, the entry of private competitors, and the early set-up of a regulatory system,
however imperfect, have played a vital role in the high growth. Despite initial hiccups46
and  false  steps  telecom  demonstrates  the  potential  contribution  to  growth  of  opening
previously  government-owned  or  monopolised  sectors  given  a  moderately  good
regulatory system to deal with natural monopoly elements and promote competition.
The financial sector dropped to third place with a lower growth rate of 9.4% per
annum (Table 2).  This brought its contribution to overall growth to 9% from 7% in sub-
phase IIA (Table 3). The introduction of modern regulatory norms and procedures led to
the exposure of hidden NPAs in the banking system (particularly public sector banks) and
slowed the growth of the banking system a cost that had to be paid for past sins.  This
was partly offset by the growth impulse imparted by gradual de-control of the banking
system and the stimulus arising from private entry and competition. The public share in
the GCF in banking and insurance fell sharply during sub-phase IIB to half its level in
sub-phase IIA, but has risen sharply since 1997-98 (47% in 1991–92, 41.7% in 1997–98).
Its share in GDP from this sector declined to 58.4% in 2000-1 from over 78% in 1990–91
(Table 4).
The electricity sector was however dethroned from its place among the top three
performers  as  its  growth  rate  slowed  to  5.7%  per  annum  (Table  2).  The  gradual
conversion of the electricity sector from a public utility to a Mafia-type operation run for
the benefit of employees and political bosses played a role in this slowdown as organised
theft increased to half of total production in some states.
64 The lack of will to challenge
power theft and the absence of a clear policy and regulatory framework for promoting
private entry and competition were major factors in the growth slowdown.
Agriculture growth slowed to 3.3% per annum, almost the same rate as seen in
sub-phase IA (Table 2), reducing its contribution to 13% of total growth (Table 3), given
that  the  share  of  agriculture  had  declined  to  about  a  fourth  of  the  GDP.  The
manufacturing sector contributed 17% to overall growth, only marginally less than its
contribution in sub-phase IA (Table 3).  Manufacturing growth accelerated to 6.8% per
annum, with both modern (registered) and traditional (unregistered) segments growing
faster (Table 2). The net effect of increased competition on manufacturing growth was
                                                          
64 I use the word ‘Mafia’ consciously as state electricity board employees reserved the right to cut of
electricity to any establishment that did not provide them free services or cash (as appropriate).47
therefore positive as improved access to imported technology and inputs and cheaper
imports more than offset the reduction in relative prices arising from lower tariffs on
output.  Intra industry trade (import & export) has also increased across a range of two-
digit industries during the nineties indicating efficiency improvements through increased
specialisation (Veeramani (2003)). This was also reflected in the remarkable stability of
the ICOR, which remained unchanged from the previous two sub-phases.
The measured ICOR for modern manufacturing however increased to 8.3 after
declining to 6.9 in sub-phase IIA from 9.6 in sub-phase IB (Table 5).  Entry of new firms
and up gradation of technology (by the more competitive firms) through new investment
with limited exit of existing firms would raise the ICOR and reduce TFPG (as measured).
65  As labour laws effectively apply only to the registered manufacturing sector, and the
exit  problem  is  most  acute  for  large  units  within  this  sub-sector,  a  lowering  of
manufacturing tariffs could be followed by a period during which measured average total
factor productivity growth (TFPG) declines.  An ICRIER working paper by D. K. Das
(2003) shows that TFPG has declined in a majority of (registered) three digit industries
during the nineties.  In our view this (probably) reflects a decline in capacity utilisation of
so called ‘sick’ and other inefficient firms that are not allowed to exit because controls
and policy restrictions. Goldar and Kumari (2003) have shown that capacity utilisation in
registered manufacturing increased during the eighties.
Mining sector growth collapsed to 3.8% per annum, only a little higher than its
low point of 3.7% in sub-phase  IB (Table 2). The slowdown was  accompanied by a
worsening of capital utilisation as the overall ICOR rose to 8.2, from 6.1 in sub-phase
IIA, and that for public sector mining increased to 14.6 (Table 5). Public sector mining’s
share in the gross value added declined to 86.7% in 2000-1 from 97.2% in 1979–80,
while its share in the GCF went up from 70% to 86.1% (Table 4). The liberalisation of
the mining sector during sub-phase IIB has been woefully inadequate, with the vital Coal
Nationalisation (Amendment) Bill  languishing  in  Parliament  for  several  years, and  a
clear policy framework and modern regulatory structure still absent for most minerals.
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Many  other  services,  besides  those  considered  above,  contributed  to  the
acceleration of non-tradable service growth. Among these were hotels and restaurants,
which had the second highest growth rate of 10.3%, trade (8%), community, social and
private services (7.7%), other transport (7%), and real estate, personal dwellings, and
business  services  (6.3%).  Several  services  grew  faster  than  registered  manufacturing
(7.1%) during this phase. Contrary to some perceptions, government administration grew
by only 6.3% per annum (table 2) and actually pulled down the average for the service
sector, even though real government consumption expenditure grew at a faster clip at
6.6% per annum (Table 1). Construction, railway, and storage were the other sectors that
grew at a lower rate than all manufacturing (6.8%) (Table 2). Thus, the gap between the
growth rate of tradable goods and services widened to its highest level of any sub-phase.
4.  Reform Puzzle: Constraints to Growth
In sub-phase IIB the puzzle is the reverse of that in sub-phase IIA. With much
wider,  deeper,  and  more  comprehensive  reform  during  this  sub-phase  (particularly  in
1991-92 and 1992-93) why has the growth rate increased only marginally above that seen
in  sub-phase  IIA?  There  are  a  number  of  possible  explanations,  which  are  discussed
below.
a)  Structural Reform: Impact Lags
It can be argued that fundamental changes in the economic policy framework take
time to work their way through the economic system as agents take time to learn and
respond  to  new  conditions.    Many  industry-linked  economists  have  asserted  that  the
nineties reforms are leading to profound changes in the way that industry conducts it
self.
66 Though these changes are visible in only a handful of pioneering companies they
will  gradually  spread  through  out  the  industry  and  the  macro  effects  will  become
apparent over the decade. We have already seen however, that the reforms initiated in
1991–92 resulted in an industrial boom during 1993–94 to 1996–97 led by the consumer
durable sector, including automobiles. Further, the underlying growth rate as measured
by the HP filtered series has been declining continuously since the peak of 6.1% in 1994–
95 and 1995-96 to reach 4.8% in 2002–03 (Table 1). Prima facie this does not provide49
support to this contention in terms of economic lags. One way to validate this assertion at
this stage would be to find other countries that went through a similar reform experience
followed  by  a  lagged  spurt  in  growth.  The  statistical  analysis  of  the  growth  impulse
(given above) however does not support this hypothesis.
b)  Real Interest Rates
One hypothesis is that growth is slower than warranted by the reforms because
interest rates are too high.
67 Using the State Bank of India (SBI) lending rate and the
wholesale  price  index  (WPI),  we  find  that  the  real  lending  rate  during  Phase  I  was
negative,  averaging  –1.9%  if  we  use  the  WPI  and  –2.3%  if  we  use  the  WPI  for
manufacturing (Table 7).  The real interest rate increased from –2.8% (-3.7%) in sub
phase IA to –0.6% (-0.9%) during sub-phase IB.  This increase could have contributed to
the decline in the growth rate between these two sub-phases. The low interest rate during
phase I was not due to the investment demand as it grew at 6.1% per annum almost the
same as the 6.3% per annum during phase II. Similarly the rise in  real interest rates
during sub-phase IB cannot be attributed to increased investment demand as the growth
rate of investment declined to 4.5% per annum from 7.9% per annum during sub-phase
IA (Table 1). At the same time the private saving rate and overall national saving rate
continued to grow.
The real interest rate increased dramatically in Phase II, averaging 7.8% to 7.9%
(Table 7). Investment demand grew at a marginally higher rate of 5% per annum during
sub-phase  IIA  than  it  did  earlier  (Table  1),  while  the  supply  of  government  saving
declined progressively over the eighties. The decline in the government saving rate must
be one important factor in the rise of real interest rate along with a possible increase in
inefficiency of the politically directed banking system (a la ‘loan melas’ in the 1980s).
The higher growth rate during phase II was therefore achieved despite the rise in interest
rates.
                                                                                                                                                                            
66 One example of such an economist is Dr. Omkar Goswami of the Confederation of  Indian Industry.
67 This stance is favoured for instance by Dr. Surjit S. Bhalla of Oxus Research.50
Table 7: Real Interest Rates (SBI) and Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER)
Phase I (1950–51 to 1979–80) Phase II (1980–81 to 2001–02)
Sub-phase Sub-phase





1 to 2002-3) (1980-91) (1992-2000)
SBI lending rate (real)
(deflated by)
WPI (total) -1.7% -2.9% -0.6% 7.8% 7.9% 7.8%
WPI (manufacturing) -2.3% -3.7% -0.9% 8.6% 8.3% 8.9%
Inflation Rate
WPI (total) 9.0% 7.3% 10.7% 7.6% 8.6% 6.5%
WPI (manufacturing) 9.6% 8.3% 10.9% 6.9% 8.2% 5.4%
REER (calendar year)
(average growth rate)
Export-Weighted Index -2.3% -0.3% -3.9% -1.4% -3.2% 0.5%
Trade-Weighted Index -0.8% -0.3% -4.1% -1.0% -2.7% 0.8%
Ratio to GDP
Fiscal Deficit-Center 3.6% 3.4% 4.1% 6.8% 7.7% 5.7%
Current Account Deficit 1.4% 1.3% 0.7% 1.3% 1.8% 0.9%
Source RBI (2003); (various years)
Note: The REERs are calculated for calendar years because data for financial years are only available from
1975–76 onwards. The REERs from 1950 to 1959 are our estimates.
There is little change in the real interest rate between sub-phases IIA and IIB
when measured using the total WPI and a marginal increase of 0.5 percentage points
when  deflated  by  the  WPI  for  manufacturing,  from  8.3%  to  8.8%  (Table  7).    This
marginal rise in real interest rates has however been more than offset by other factors
(‘animal  spirits’  activated  by  the  ‘new  economic  policy’)  with  real  gross  domestic
investment accelerating to 7.8% per annum during sub-phase IIB (Table 1).  Thus, at this
broad level of analysis, real interest rates do not explain the growth puzzle.
At the same time, the above analysis does not imply that real interest rates do not
have an impact on private investment or economic growth. It is quite possible that the
growth  rate  would  have  been  higher  than  it  was,  if  real  rates  were  lower.    Perhaps
manufacturing growth during sub-phase IIB would have been higher if real interest rates
were lower. The average real interest rate at 6.9% (7.7%) during 1994-5 to 1996-7 was
somewhat lower than the average for sub-phase IIB as a whole, and could have provided
some growth stimulus. The small decline in the real rate thereafter is likely the result of a
fall in effective demand from the private sector as growth petered out.51
 The  precise  impact  of  interest  rates  on  these  variables  will  be  analysed  in
subsequent work.  This requires recognition of the fact that Indian credit markets are not
as developed, competitive or free as those of the developed countries. The floor on saving
deposit rates in banks plays a small role, but other factors are much more important.  The
legacy of nationalisation of banking (in sub-phase IB) and the introduction of wide and
deep structure of controls and directed credit still shapes the monetary system despite the
liberalisation of the nineties.  The multiple role of the RBI as the government’s debt
manager (salesman), proxy manager of the nationalised banks, and regulator responsible
for the health of the payment system often results in actions that are not consistent with
efficient monetary management.   In our view these contradictions have kept the RBI
from lowering the short-term (1 to 7 day) repo rates during periods of low growth and
moderate inflation and weak private credit demand since 1997-98.  One consequence of
these high repo rates has been to put a floor under the overnight inter-bank, call-money
rates and thus prop up the entire structure of bank lending rates.  Another outcome of this
policy has been a rising differential between domestic short-term rates and global short-
term rates during 2002.  This has attracted short-term capital inflows during 2002-3.
An  additional  factor  in  the  downward  stickiness  of  bank  interest  rates  is  the
government monopoly of the banking system with government banks still constituting
about 70% of total bank assets, the highest proportion in the world.  With the RBI and
government  either  exercising  regulatory  forbearance  or  conniving  in  keeping  deposit
rates high and stable, loan interest rates often do not reflect  credit market conditions
during periods of low demand/excess supply.
The inflation rate relevant for determining the real overnight rate is the current
rate. Expectations about future inflation are irrelevant in determining such rates.   Those
who assert that expectations of higher future inflation (because of high fiscal deficit and
rising government debt) have kept bank lending rates (for one year or more) high have
been disproved by the flat term structure of interest rates on government paper during
2002-3. The floors on the  Government Provident  Fund (GPF) and Post office saving
instruments (so called small saving instruments) have not kept this from happening.52
c)  Incomplete Reform: Reform Gaps
Another argument for the under-responsiveness of the tradable goods sector to the
trade  and  other  liberalisation  of  the  nineties  is  the  lack  of  sufficient  complementary
domestic reforms. These arguments are however quite distinct from arguments about the
hollowing out of Indian manufacturing or of the manufacturing sector being a drag on
overall growth.  Manufacturing growth in sub-phase IIB at 6.8% per annum has not only
been distinctly higher than the 6.1% per annum in sub-phase IIA but also higher than the
6.6% per annum average during sub-phase IA (Table 2).
Though reduction of protection has created the conditions for labour-intensive
agriculture and manufacturing to grow and export, India’s tariff rates remain among the
highest in the world [Virmani (2002a)]. Domestic policy constraints have kept even the
limited  potential  created  so  far  from  being  fully  exploited.  Thus,  labour-intensive
manufacturing continues to be hampered by the anachronistic SSI reservation policy and
labour laws, rules, and procedures that have converted labour from a variable to a fixed
factor in firms with over 100 employees, with attendant consequences on employment.
Minimum  wage  laws  applied  to  modern  (power-using)  firms  with  more  than  10
employees and excise tax exemptions for firms with sales up to Rs.1 crore ($200,000),
continue to distort the entire system of production and efficient division of labour, such
as in the textile sector.  This explanation is consistent with the statistical analysis of the
growth impulse and its petering out.
As many of these policies were introduced during sub-phase IB, the increase in
the share of manufacturing in GDP was only 2.4 percentage points during this period,
compared to an average increase of 3.1 percentage points for the countries of S. Asia
(Table 8).  It is not surprising that with the persistence of policy distortions (in some
cases even a worsening), the share of manufacturing increased by only 2.3 percentage
points during phase II. The share of manufacturing at 17.1% of the total GDP is therefore
currently less than half that in China (34.5%) and a little more than half that in Malaysia
(32.8%), Thailand (31.9%), and the average for East Asia & Pacific (31.8%) (Table 8).
Similarly the lack of reform in the agriculture and allied sector has hampered the
growth of agriculture [Virmani and Rajeev (2002d)]. The State monopoly over electricity53
production and supply coupled with the organised theft of power [Virmani (1996)] is
another factor that affects growth of modern manufacturing and agriculture.
d)  Governance Deterioration: Public Goods
One argument made earlier is as follows: the pace of reform has picked up during the nineties
and has had a positive effect on growth. This has been offset by a slow but steady deterioration
in governance over the last several decades that is beginning to have a significant negative
effect on growth [Virmani (2002b)]. Thus, the net effect of the positive reform factor and the
negative governance factor may be a growth ‘plateau.’ This explanation is also consistent with
the statistical analysis of the growth impulse.
Governance  deterioration  also  has  another  paradoxical  result.    As  noted  earlier,
deterioration in the quality and efficiency of “Market distorting institutions” (Virmani(2004))
during  sub-phase  IIA,  meant  that  the  effectiveness  of  several  controls  and  licenses  was
undermined.  Thus when these controls and licenses were formally eliminated in sub-phase IIB,
the effect on growth was less than one would expect if governance quality had remained
unchanged, as the degree of ‘de-facto’ de-control was less than the ‘de-jure’ de-control.
The deterioration in the electricity and railway monopolies run by the government is
examples of this general deterioration in governance.  Both these are however “private” goods
and have (less efficient) substitutes in the form of private generation and road transport.
68
More important, these artificially created monopolies can be dismantled through private entry,
selected privatisation and independent regulatory systems.  This is much more difficult in the
case of “Public Goods,” as private substitutes are an option for a very limited number of the
richest and most powerful.  Thus the deterioration in the supply of “Public goods” like law and
order, safety and security, courts, police, roads, public health, and civic education and “Quasi-
public” goods (drinking water, sewage, sanitation, basic education and rural infrastructure) has
a powerful negative effect on the economy and on public welfare.
                                                          
68 Though they have substantial externalities in rural areas.54










Last year of data
in Phase II
Country (1950-51) (1965-66) (1980-81) (1992-93) (2002-03)
India 8.9% 13.1% 13.8% 15.7% 17.1%
China
1 29.2% 40.5% 33.1% 34.5%
Indonesia
1 8.4% 13.0% 19.1% 26.0%
Malaysia
1 9.5% 21.6% 25.8% 32.8%
Thailand
1 14.2% 21.5% 27.5% 31.9%
South Asia
1 13.5% 15.8% 16.1% 15.6%
East Asia & the Pacific
1 21.0% 30.6% 28.7% 31.8%
Change during period (percentage points)
Sub-phase Sub-phase
Phase I  I A I B Phase II II A  II B
(1951-79) (1951-64) (1965-79) (1980-2002) (1980-91) (1992-2002)
India 6.0 3.6 2.4 2.3 1.0 1.3
China
2 10.8 -5.5 -7.3 1.8
Indonesia 3.3 14.4 2.6 11.8
Malaysia 11.0 12.8 5.6 7.2
Thailand 7.2 10.8 7.2 3.6
South Asia 3.1 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3
East Asia & the Pacific 1.7 -1.9 3.6
Sources: CSO and World Bank (2002)
Notes
1.  The data on manufacturing share in the GDP for other regions and countries are reported for calendar
years, i.e. for 1965, 1980, 1992, and 2000 and are available only between 1965 and 2000.
2.  The change in ratio for China over sub-phase IB is computed with 1965 as the first year because data
for 1964 is not available.
 There is an impression that government’s role in production and supply of good and
services has been reduced during the broad reform sub-phase (IIB).  The reality is that the GDP
from public sector averaged 25.9% of total GDP during sub-phase IIB, 2.6% points higher than
in sub-phase IIA (23.3%).  The sharp and continuing rise of the share has, however, been
arrested, with the share in 2000-1 (25.8%) almost identical to that at the end of phase IIA
(Table 4).  Thus there is still considerable scope for eliminating government involvement in the
production and supply of private goods and enhancing it in public goods.
The proposed solution to the problem of deteriorating governance is, (a) to get the
government completely out of the production and supply of private goods. (b) To narrow its55
focus on public goods and quasi public goods (strong externalities) and social security aspects
that government is expected to achieve but has neglected [Virmani (2002b)].
e)  Credibility of Reforms
Reform can only have an effect on economic actors if the reforms are credible. The
more limited reforms undertaken during the eighties had great credibility, and their effect on
the economy was therefore magnified.  The reforms undertaken in 1991-92 and 1992-93 were
much more comprehensive, but took a few years to gain credibility as they were wrongly
perceived (initially) as being driven by the IMF/World bank.  Agents were afraid that the
reforms might be reversed once the crises passed.  The reforms gained some credibility by
1993-94 and the effect was felt in the 1993-4 recovery and subsequent boom (1994-5 to 1996-
7).  Subsequent economic policy actions have been characterised by a ‘two steps forward and
one step backward’ approach that (perhaps) gradually eroded this credibility.
The political economy of Indian reforms since 1993-4 seems to be that whenever
reforms are beginning to take-off, someone within the ruling party, the ruling coalition or its
supporting organisations feels it is in their interests to undermine and slow down or even halt
the  entire  process.
69    In  fact  the  position  may  have  worsened  with  ‘two-and-a-half  steps
forward’ being followed by ‘two steps backward’.  The result of this vacillation is a lack of
credibility and a repeatedly aborted growth take-off, during the nineties.  Thus, the enormous
growth potential of the Indian economy is not being realised because of the constraints placed
on it by the Indian political system. Some economists have asserted that this is because the
Opposition parties oppose all reforms when they are not in the government even if they initiate
or support reform when they are in power.  In our view it is the duty of the Opposition to
criticise and question change, within limits.
70  The public and economic agents accept such
questioning as natural in a democratic country such as India. What is not acceptable is internal
criticism, sabotage, and worse from within the ruling set-up—this has a much more devastating
effect on the credibility of reforms.
                                                          
69 Whether this is the old ‘crab theory’ of Indians in operation or something else, this is what we have
repeatedly seen in every government since around 1994–95.
70 The limit is not exceeded if for instance the opposition party after criticism and testing of the Treasury
benches in the Lok Sabha (ruling coalition has a majority) does not kill reform bills in the Rajya Sabha
(where it has a majority).56
III. Global Comparison
Ahluwalia (1988) states that “In the period up to the mid-seventies India’s growth rate
of around 3.5 per cent per year was much lower than the average of about 6.0 per cent achieved
by developing countries as a whole. In the past ten years, however, India’s growth rate has
accelerated, while growth rates in most of the developing world have decelerated.  India’s
growth  rate in  the period 1981–86 was  almost  5  per  cent, when  all developing countries
together grew by 2.5 per cent, while non-oil-developing countries grew at 3.5 per cent per year.
In fact India’s growth performance in the eighties is exceeded only by some of the fastest
growing East Asian economies and China.” Bhagwati (1993) states that from the mid-fifties to
the end of the seventies, “not merely did India’s weak performance in increasing income and
per capita income fall below her own aspirations, it also put India behind many developing
countries in this race, and way behind the super-performers of the Far East.”  Ahluwalia (1995)
states that, “India' s growth performance was close to the bottom of the group during 1965–80
and improved to the middle of the range in 1980–90,” in comparison with “not only high-flyers
such as Korea, but other large economies such as Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, and China, on the
one hand, and India' s small neighbours such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, on the
other hand.” More recently De Long (2002) concluded that the performance of the Indian
economy was about the average of the developing countries prior to 1980.
A.  Socialist Rate of Growth
 Since  different  authors  use  different  periods  for  comparison  a  multiplicity  of
conclusions have been drawn. It is therefore useful to compare the performance of the Indian
economy in terms of the phases or sub-phases that we have found to be relevant when we look
at the performance of the Indian economy in isolation.  As comparable data on economic
growth during the fifties is available for only a very limited set of countries, we start with the
sixties. During 1961–64, India’s GDP-growth ranking was 39 out of the set of 73 medium and
large economies, those with a GDP at factor cost in 2000 greater than $15 million, for which
data is available for this period. Thus, it is quite plausible that India’s performance during
1950–64 was around the median of all countries. India’s performance deteriorated dramatically
during 1965–79 (sub-phase IB), falling to 69
th among a slightly larger set of 79 countries for
which the GDP-growth data is available (Table 9).  So, during this period only 6 developing
countries had an average growth rate lower than the 2.8% per annum average for India. This in57
our view was an abysmal performance for a country with India’s potential. As recognised quite
early by a few perceptive Indian economists like Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan(1974,
1984) the inferior performance was the result of the economic policies introduced during the
period.
B.  Bharatiya Rate of Growth
The performance of the Indian economy improved dramatically from the 1980s as
documented  in  Virmani  (1999b).  India’s  growth  ranking  improved  sharply  to  9
th  position
during the 21-year period from 1980 to 2000 out of a larger set of 86 medium-large countries
for which comparable data is available for this period (Table 9).  Thus what we have termed the
‘Bharatiya rate of growth,’ was not just better performance relative to our own earlier growth,
but also far superior to that of most other countries in the world. India’s rank has improved over
the last few years despite a fall in its growth rate, because other country growth rates have
fallen even more. Thus, our rank improves by one position to eighth if we take either the 22
years from 1980 to 2001 or the 23 years from 1980 to 2002. Only China, Singapore, Taiwan, S.
Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand had a higher average growth rate than India during the
last 23 years. This is a creditable performance by global standards.
India’s rank was somewhat lower during the two sub-phases.  India ranked 12th during
sub-phase IIA (1980 to 1991) with Hong Kong, Indonesia, Pakistan and Cyprus also growing
faster during this period. Our rank improved to 10
th during sub-phase IIB (1992 to 2002) as the
growth rate of S. Korea, Taiwan and Thailand fell sharply after 1997 while the growth rate of
Ireland,  Uganda,  Mozambique  and  Dominican  Republic  improved.    Thus  only  China,
Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam had a higher GDP growth rate than India in the full phase as
well as in both sub-phases.58
Table 9: India’s Comparative Growth Rate and Global Growth Rank
Period growth rates Variation in Rank Over Last Two Decades
Rank Growth rate (%) (based on 10-year moving averages)
Sub-phase Sub-phase
















































China 73 25 1 1 1 1 1 -1.8 6.1 9.0 9.8 9.5 9.4 9.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Singapore 29 2 5 7 2 2 2 5.8 10.5 7.5 6.4 7.7 7.2 7.0 5 4 5 5 7 3 2 5 7
Korea, Rep. 27 4 3 13 4 3 3 6.1 9.0 7.8 5.6 7.0 6.8 6.8 4 3 2 2 5 6 11 15 13
Taiwan 3 2 17 3 4 4 10.2 7.9 5.3 7.2 6.8 6.6 3 2 3 4 4 9 10 16 16
Vietnam 4 6 6 5 7.2 6.4 6.3 6.3 84 90 91 92 10 4 4 5
Malaysia 22 13 9 8 5 5 6 6.7 7.3 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.4 6.3 12 12 10 7 9 5 6 8 11
Thailand 19 9 4 33 7 7 7 6.9 7.8 7.7 4.0 6.2 6.0 5.9 7 6 4 3 3 2 30 38 44
India 39 69 12 10 9 8 8 5.2 2.8 5.5 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6 15 10 11 11 17 13 20 11 10
Indonesia 68 16 7 37 10 10 9 2.3 6.8 6.8 3.8 5.6 5.5 5.4 10 8 7 6 8 8 34 39 45
Hong Kong 2 7 6 39 8 9 10 13.2 8.6 6.8 3.8 5.8 5.5 5.4 2 5 6 8 10 14 32 34 43
Ireland 52 43 31 3 13 11 11 4.2 4.7 3.5 7.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 44 35 23 27 28 16 5 3 3
Uganda 28 6 16 14 12 6.6 5.2 5.2 5.3 85 93 94 29 11 8 7 6
Pakistan 21 35 8 35 12 13 13 6.7 5.5 6.5 3.9 5.4 5.3 5.3 6 7 8 10 13 21 40 40 47
Chile 46 65 14 11 11 12 14 4.5 3.1 4.6 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.2 20 14 22 18 6 7 7 15 14
Cyprus 10 28 14 15 15 5.8 4.3 5.2 5.2 5.0 8 9 9 9 12 15 36 29 36
Egypt (EAR) 17 33 11 26 15 16 16 7.1 5.5 5.5 4.4 5.2 5.1 5.0 11 11 12 12 23 33 33 26 25
Bangladesh 35 76 16 19 19 18 17 5.5 2.3 4.4 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.6 16 17 15 21 22 29 26 21 18
Luxembourg 54 66 18 21 17 17 18 4.1 3.0 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.6 31 15 16 13 11 18 14 18 17
Sri Lanka 59 44 17 24 18 21 20 3.6 4.7 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.5 18 19 18 20 21 26 21 27 21
Sources
1.  World Bank (2002), 4 (5) years data is missing for Uganda (Vietnam) during the eighties.
2.  IMF WEO (recent  years)59
It is interesting that the 23-year growth ranking for India is better than its growth
ranking  in  either  sub-period  (of  13  years  and  10  years,  respectively).    The  reason  is  the
remarkable stability in the growth rate of India relative to some of the other high-growth
economies.  This is reflected in the growth ranking based on the 10-year moving average
growth rate. India’s growth rank by this measure has fluctuated between 10
th and 15
th with a
mean position of about 13
th (Table 9).  There were five periods in which the rank was better
and  two  periods  in  which  the  rank  was  much  worse.  The  best  10-year  performance  has
occurred at the start and end of the period, with a rank of 10
th for the decade of the eighties
(1980–89) and for the period 1993–2002. The former followed an improvement from 15
th for
the period from 1979 to 1988. Following the BOP crisis of 1990–91 the rank deteriorated to
17
th for the period from 1984 to 1993. There was a sharp improvement in rank following the
introduction of the new economic policy in the nineties to 13
th for the period 1987–96. After
remaining around this level the position collapsed temporarily to 20
th for the period 1991–2000,
partly because of the export-led recovery of East Asia (Table 9).
C.  Comparison of Service Shares
Our analysis has shown that services played a role in the step up in the GDP growth
rate from the mid-eighties.
71  The recovery in manufacturing growth from 1981-2 was however
equally significant.  Consequently there was little discontinuity in the share of GDP from
services.  The share of services in GDP at 1993-4 prices rose almost linearly from 32% in
1950-51 to about 58% in 2002-3 (i.e. about 0.5 per cent point per year).  The service share has,
however, been above this linear trend for the last five years or so.
To see whether the share of services in Indian GDP is excessively high we need to
compare it with the share in other countries.  We do this by constructing the average share
during 1992 to 2000 (sub-phase IIB) along with the average per capita GDP at constant ppp
(pcgdpk) and regress one against the other to derive a normative value of the service share at
each income level.
72  India’s average service share is then compared with this norm. For the
160 countries for which data is available in the World Development Indicators we find that that
a third order polynomial in pcgdpk fits the data best.  Based on this equation India’s average
                                                          
71 See also Gordon and Gupta (2003).60
service share of 45% (+2%) is almost identical to the predicted/normative value of 44% based
on India’s average pcgdpk during the period.  Thus we conclude that the Service sector share
during phase IIB was normal.
We repeat this exercise for the period 1980 to 1991 (sub-phase IIA) with the smaller set
of countries (148) for which data is available in the World Bank’s WDI.  In this case we find
that the average service share for India was (at 40%) 6% lower than the norm of 43%.  The
faster growth of services during phase II, therefore, seems to have corrected an imbalance that
had emerged earlier.
The exercise for 1992-2000 shows that with the exception of the island economies of
Singapore (+1%) and Hong Kong (+28%) most other fast growing economies had an average
service share less than the norm for their per capita GDP.  These countries (with the average
service share in brackets) are Vietnam (-3%), Chile (-4%), Thailand (-8%), Ireland (-13%),
Indonesia (-14%), S Korea (-19%), Malaysia (-21%) and China (-31%).  The reason for this
contrast between the other high growth economies and India, is the failure of the manufacturing
sector in India to grow as fast as it did in these high growth economies.  As a consequence the
structural transformation of the Indian economy from agriculture to manufacturing has not
taken place.  If the manufacturing sector can be freed of the remaining shackles and distortions,
the rate of growth of GDP and of employment can be accelerated.
                                                                                                                                                                            
72 We use the US GDP deflator to convert from current US$ to constant US$ 1995 Prices.61
IV. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the growth performance of India since 1950-51. It is widely
believed that the Indian economy has become less dependent on the weather over the last half
century of independence.  This paper shows that there is a statistically insignificant reduction of
the impact of rainfall on Indian agriculture and of rainfall on the Indian economy (as a whole).
In other words agriculture and GDP growth are both as dependent on rainfall in the fourth
quarter of the century as they were in the third.
The paper also shows that Indian economic growth has been remarkably stable. We are
statistically able to distinguish only two phases of growth during its post-colonial history. The
first  phase  characterised  as  the  ‘Indian-socialist’  rate  of  growth  (ISRG)  starts  after
independence and lasts to the end of the seventies. The proportion of the population below the
poverty line increased during this phase from 45.3% in 1951 to 47.3% in 1979-80. The second
phase, which starts thereafter (1980–81) is still going on and is characterised as the ‘Bharatiya’
rate of growth (BRG) phase. There was a sharp and statistically significant acceleration in the
growth rate during the BRG phase. During the ISRG phase the economy averaged a growth of
3.5% per annum with per capita growth averaging 1.3% per annum.  Growth accelerated to an
average of 5.7% per annum during the BRG phase with per capita income growing at an
average rate of 3.6% per annum. The Poverty rate (proportion of people below the poverty line)
declined from an average 52.8% of the population during the ISRG phase to a (conservatively
estimated) average of 36.6% of the population during the BRG phase.
 We also find a (statistically) significant acceleration in the rate of growth of services
during the BRG phase.  In the case of manufacturing the higher growth rate during the eighties
was more in the nature of a recovery from the oppressive hand of socialist controls & public
monopolies and a closing of the gap between actual and potential output that had opened as a
consequence.  As a consequence the share of GDP from services does not show any abrupt
change (discontinuity) and has been rising slowly but steadily over the past half century.  The
paper debunks the scare talk of the unsustainability of “service led growth” by showing that the
average share of services in GDP during the last decade was close to the estimated global norm
for a country of India’s per capita GDP level.62
In this paper we argue that each of the two phases of economic growth can be divided
into two sub-phases based on the nature of the policy regime and the development focus.  The
growth rate in one sub-phase of a given phase differs from that in the other sub-phase, but this
difference is not statistically significant.  From the policy perspective, however these four sub-
phases (Quest for commanding heights, Socialist rate of growth,  Modest reform and Broader
reform), can be thought of as distinct.  The growth rate declined from 4.1% per annum during
the Commanding heights sub-phase to 2.6% per annum in the Socialist rate of growth phase. It
is hypothesised that this was due to a combination of direct control on private activity and the
accumulating  burden  of  government  imposed  costs.      These  costs  arose  from  oppressive
controls as well as from the crowding out of private production by public sector supply of
goods  and  services  unconstrained  by  compulsions  of  profitability,  efficiency,  and  quality.
Supply-side factors such as the rise in global oil prices, which acted as an external tax on
citizens and the inefficiency of public utility monopolies contributed to the slowdown. Credible
changes  in  the  direction  of  economic  philosophy  that  resulted  in  some  liberalisation  of
industrial (production and investment) controls and the trade regime (particularly with respect
to exports and capital goods imports) played a role in the recovery  of  growth during  the
eighties.
The conclusion of earlier papers that India’s performance during the first three decades
was around the average of the developing countries’ is not supported by the facts presented in
this paper.  This was only true during the Commanding heights sub-phase (15 years).  In the
socialist  rate  of  growth sub-phase (next  15  years),  India’s  performance  plummeted to  the
bottom of the global order, with only six developing and four developed countries having a
GDP growth rate lower than that of India.
With a change in orientation of the government from socialism to market there was a
change  in  the  rhetoric  of  the  government  and  of  intellectuals  and  consequently  in  the
atmosphere/environment  in  which  private  agents  and  investors  operate.    This  change  in
orientation started in the late seventies when the still ‘socialist’ oriented Mrs Gandhi broke the
railway strike in 1976.  The change continued with the coming to power of so called ‘right-
wing’ political parties such as the Congress (O) and the BJP (though some of the coalition
partners were Indian socialists).   There was consequently an acceleration of GDP growth from63
the socialist rate of Growth of 2.6% per annum to 5.6% annum during the Modest Reform sub-
phase of BRG.
One ‘puzzle’ is how such a significant growth impulse resulted from what appear
prima  facie to be modest  changes  in  the  control  regime.    The  paper  has  argued  that  the
economic reforms introduced during the 1980s had a great deal of credibility.  As a result the
rate of growth of private investment accelerated and the structure of investment moved towards
machinery & equipment and the quality of machinery and equipment improved because of
greater  access  to  imported  capital  goods.    This  played  an  important  role  in  the  growth
acceleration.  In addition, the output gap had opened up during the Socialist Growth sub-phase
due to the (policy resultant) suppression of economic growth below its potential was closed
during the ‘modest reform’ sub-phase.  This gap was eliminated during the first sub-phase of
the BRG period, partly because of the supply side stimulus provided by slower growth of oil
prices and the demand side stimulus provided by the rising fiscal deficit.  Thus the acceleration
of growth in the first sub-phase of BRG had a substantial element of temporary acceleration
above its potential, a catch-up process that bridged the output gap by around 1990-91.
There was also a small increase in the growth rate in second sub-phase of BRG (over
and above this ‘gap closing’ acceleration) following the introduction of broader reforms.  This
constitutes  the  second  ‘puzzle’,  the  obverse  of  the  first—why  such  major  and  fairly
comprehensive reform raised the growth rate of the economy only modestly?   The paper
explores the potential reasons and analyses their broad impact and importance. Four reasons are
found to be most compelling: One the gaps in the reform process. Two the failure of public
monopolies to provide critical infrastructure services like electricity and rail transport. Three the
deterioration of government supply of public and quasi-public goods (quantity & quality). Four
the dissension within the ruling coalition / party / organisation that undermine credibility of
reform.  The growth puzzles will be explored further in forthcoming papers.
India’s global growth rank has improved dramatically to 8
th during the BRG phase,
with the rank being 12
th during the first sub-phase and 10
th during the second sub-phase.  The
rank for the entire phase is better than that in either sub-phase, because the growth rate has been
less volatile than in many other countries.64
We seem currently to be stuck at the ‘Bharatiya’ rate of growth of around 5.8% per
annum.
73  In fact the trend rate in 2002-3 appeared to be about 1% point lower than this
because of the very sharp cyclical decline in growth that occurred in 2002-3.  With the cyclical
recovery of the economy to a predicted 8% plus growth in 2003-4 and a forecast of 6% growth
rate in 2004-5, the economy is returning to the ‘Bharatiya’ rate of growth trend of 5.8% per
annum.
Forthcoming papers will however explore, whether there are underlying improvements
or structural changes in productivity that have not been translated into higher growth so far, but
which could in future result in a sustained upward shift in the growth trend.
                                                          
73 Based on CSO data.  The WDI data gives a lower average of 5.6%.65
V. Appendix: Methodology
The analysis through out the paper is based on rates of growth.  The annual rate of
growth (GrY) is defined for any variable Y as  GrY(t) = Y(t)/Y(t-1) – 1.  Trend growth
rates are defined in three ways.
(a) By taking a moving average.  Thus a five year moving average can be defined as
MA5Y(t) = [Y(t)+Y(t-1)+Y(t-2)+Y(t-3)+Y(t-4)]/5. This moving average is centred on
year t-2.
(b) By applying the Hoderick-Prescott filter to the basic series Y to get the filtered series
Xhp and then determining its growth rate i.e. GrYhp(t) = Yhp(t)/Yhp(-1) –1.  GrYhp(t)
then shows the trend rate of growth as against the actual annual growth rate GrY(t) .
(c) By fitting a polynomial of order 2 or 3 or more to the actual growth rate GrY(t) i.e.
estimating the coefficients a, b, c ( d etc.)  in the equation GrY(t) = a + bt + ct
2  (+ d t
3 )
+ut , where t is time or year and ut is a random error term.
We also use growth regressions to search for breaks in the growth performance of
the economy in terms of its Gross Domestic Product at factor cost.  Conceptually the
evolution of the economy can be defined by set of (endogenous) variables such as GDP,
current account deficit, foreign exchange reserves, fiscal deficit, exports, imports, prices,
money  supply,  employment  etc.    Each  of  the  endogenous  variables  (vector  Y)  are
functions of each other and of exogenous variables.  The latter consist of policy variables
P (e.g. tariff rates) and external environment Z (e.g. rainfall, world oil prices, world GDP
growth).  In reduced form we can write the endogenous variables as functions of the
exogenous variables, Y = F (P, Z).
In the Indian context the most important exogenous variable Z is rainfall variation
and we take account of this variable in examining GDP growth and growth of GDP from
different sectors.  Other exogenous variables such as oil price shocks have been thought
to affect the growth of the economy, but the rate of growth of oil prices is found to be
statistically in significant in the GDP growth regressions.
74  Therefore Y = F (P, rainfall).
There  are  two  difficulties  that  arise  in  directly  introducing  policy  variables  into  the
estimating equation.  Firstly continuous series are not available from 1950 to the current66
time. For instance the average tariff rate is available from 1980 onwards, but not before.
The second problem is that some variables may be either exogenous policy variables (P)
or endogenous outcomes (Y) depending on the policy regime. Thus for instance in a
controlled system the exchange rate and many interest rates are directly controlled policy
variables set by the government while in a market system they are outcomes of market
supply and demand.  The difficulty is compounded if they are target variables even in the
market situation.   These technical problems can be dealt with by appropriate econometric
techniques.  In this paper, however, we take an alternative simpler route.
We  assume  that  different  periods  (i)  in  India’s  history  were  characterised  by
different sets of policies Pi. For instance if there were four periods then i= 1, 2, 3, 4.  To
find out whether any set of policies Pi had an effect on the growth rate we introduce a
dummy variable Di into the equation to represent the policies during the period (the time
subscript t is dropped):
GrY = A + B*Drainm  + Di + U
Where Drainm is the deviation of rainfall from mean and U is the error term.  If Di for
period i is statistically significant, we take this as a demonstration of a significant effect
of the complex of policies Pi pursued during the period on the growth of Y during the
period.  The policies Pi are then analysed in a qualitative way.  Formal modelling of the
effect  of  policies  on  endogenous  variables  and  its  econometric  estimation  is  left  for
subsequent papers.
As far as Y is concerned, it should be kept in mind that total GDP is by definition
the sum of the GDP from different sectors (e.g. Agriculture, Manufacturing, Services).
Thus a policy that affects even one sector will affect overall GDP growth through this
sector.  Some polices may affect more than one sector, with the relative effect on these
sectors varying over time.  A given policy may  also affect one sector positively and
another negatively.  In this case the effect on overall GDP growth may be either positive
or  negative.    A  set  of  policies  will  in  general  have  positive  and  negative  effects  on
different  sectors,  with  the  net  effect  on  overall  GDP  being  an  aggregation  of  these
sectoral impacts.  The dummy variable method will only indicate the net affect of all
                                                                                                                                                                            
74 When growth rate of world oil prices is added to equation (1) of text, its t statistic is –1.4 and Probability
0.167, i.e. it is not significant at the 10% level of confidence.67
these policies and will not help us in identifying which policy has a positive and which a
negative effect on a specific sector (or on aggregate GDP).
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